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This thesis looks at the NATO discourse in three Russian newspapers in the period between 
2004 and 2010. It analyzes some of the main perspectives on NATO in an attempt to gain a 
better understanding of Russian views on the alliance. The analysis show that while some 
perspectives on the alliance are rooted back to the time of the Cold War, others are the result 
of important events in the Russia-NATO relationship that happened within the period of the 
analysis. The analysis also shows that despite the lack of press freedom in Russia, the debate 
about NATO in the three chosen papers: Rossiskaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and 
Noavaya Gazeta, displays a range of perspective on both the alliance and on the how the 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
 
1.0 The aim of the thesis 
During the Cold War the Soviet Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
were each other’s main adversaries. Following the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War, the Russian Federation emerged as one of 15 new countries and as the main 
heir of the USSR. This meant that Russia inherited the Soviet Union’s complex relationship 
with NATO. Following four decades of mutual mistrust, post-Soviet Russia and the alliance 
embarked upon a partnership that since the beginning of the 1990s has been through both 
positive and difficult phases. Since the new partnership was established, the suspension of 
formal contact between NATO and Russia through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), as a 
result of Russia’s war with Georgia the summer of 2008, has served as a definite highpoint in 
terms of confrontational tensions. However, after the break, a period of resuming contact and 
reestablishing the partnership followed. 
This thesis’ main goal is to analyze the NATO discourse in Russian newspapers in 
order to gain a better understanding of the Russian view on the alliance. By studying articles 
from three different Russian newspapers, this thesis will look at some of the main 
perspectives on the alliance in Russia. Hopefully, this might also contribute to a better 
understanding of Russia’s relationship with the organization. The period of interest for this 
study is from the beginning of 2004 until the end of 2010. This timeframe has been set due to 
its distinct pattern of rising tensions between Russia and the alliance up to the summer of 
2008, and by a decrease in tensions in the years that followed. This period includes the 
second presidential term of Vladimir Putin, and the nearly three first years of Dmitri 
Medvedev’s first term as president of the Russian Federation.1 During Putin’s second 
presidential term, Moscow’s foreign policy became increasingly assertive, in line with the 
economic upturn the country experienced at the time. This new Russian self-confidence 
resulted in a steady downward turn in its relationship with the West in general, and with 
NATO in particular. The war with Georgia in August 2008, happened only months into 
Medvedev’s presidency, which caused the suspension of formal Russia-NATO contact. 
                                                 
1
 Dmitri Medvedev’s first term as president of the Russian Federation lasts until the new presidential election in 
2012, but it is the period from when he was elected in 2008 until the end of 2010 that has been set as a timeframe 
for this study. 
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However, after the war and the following break, a somewhat softer approach has been 
detected from Moscow’s side in relations to the alliance.  
It is worth noting that, while the NATO debate within the study’s timeframe was 
concerned with a range of topics, the aspect of enlargement
2
 of NATO has clearly been one of 
its main concerns. By enlargement, I am referring both to the actual inclusion of new 
members into the alliance, but also to the competition for influence in the post-Soviet space, 
where Russia believes it ought to play a special role. Due to the importance of this subject 
between 2004 and 2010, this aspect of the debate will be the analysis’ main concern. 
By examining the debate about NATO in Russian newspapers during this period, 
which has such a clear low-high-low development in tensions, the images of NATO and the 
perspectives on the alliance can be analyzed in terms of whether the NATO discourse in 
Russian newspapers has been static or altered in line with the overall debate.  
The analysis of the NATO discourse will hopefully give valuable insight on a 
variety of Russian perspectives on the alliance, which in turn can contribute to a better 
understanding of Russia’s relationship with the organization. In addition, these perspectives 
may also be valuable in terms of views on Russia’s role in a contemporary world, which do 
not only affect its relationship with NATO, but also other aspects of Russian foreign policy. 
With this as a point of departure, this thesis main research question is as follows: 
In the light of the development of the Russia-NATO relationship from 
2004 until 2010, what can the discourse about NATO in Russian 
newspapers tell us about Russian perspectives on the alliance in 
particular and on Russia’s foreign policy in general? 
Furthermore, six sub questions are added to this main question in an attempt to clarify 
important aspects of the NATO discourse. The Russian media climate is known for being 
under governmental control and suffering from lack of press freedom. As the main subjects of 
the analysis of this thesis are articles from Russian newspapers, the aspect of whether there 
really is a debate in these newspapers must be examined. Thus, the first question asks whether 
there was a debate about NATO in the newspapers from 2004 until 2010.  
In order to answer the question to what extent there was a debate, it might be 
useful to look at whether the articles were keeping close to the official Russian line when 
                                                 
2
 The terms “enlargement” and “expansion” are used about NATO’s process of including new members into the 
alliance, to utter a positive or negative stand, respectively. In my thesis I choose to use the tem enlargement, not 




treating NATO matters. Therefore, the second question asks whether the perspectives on 
NATO in the articles were consistent with, or in contrast to official views on the alliance. 
One might expect that if the perspectives on NATO in the articles were close to 
the official view, analysis and comments would be kept out. The third question therefore asks 
whether the articles in the Russian newspapers were of a descriptive rather than a normative 
character. 
Moreover, in order to analyze the main perspectives on NATO in the Russian 
newspaper discourse, it might be worth noting whether the views on the alliance were mainly 
negative, or if there also were positive views on the alliance. Thus, the fourth question asks if 
there was a trend that the image of NATO in the debate was mainly negative, or if a more 
nuanced position could be detected. 
 In order to get a better understanding how NATO was perceived in Russian 
newspapers within the period of this study, it can be valuable to ask what the debate’s main 
concerns were and study these closer. Hence, the fifth question asks what topics were given 
most attention during the period, and what can be said to be the debate’s main concerns 
between 2004 and the end of 2010.  
The sixth and last question is linked to the change of presidency in 2008, from 
Putin to Medvedev, and whether this had an effect on the debate. If the change in presidency 
could be detected in the debate, then what did these alterations consist of, and if not, then 
what does it say about the debate about NATO in Russia. 
In the following, I will describe the outline of the thesis as a way to illustrate the 
study’s main focus and give an overview of how I attempt to answer the questions asked. 
 
1.1 The outline  
After these introductory notes, the next part of this chapter will look at the theoretical and 
methodical framework of the analysis of the articles. I will show how the analytical 
framework of a discourse analysis (DA) may be used as a point of departure for this study. A 
discourse analysis takes into consideration under what circumstances a text is written in. 
Using the main principles of such an analytical framework is useful for implementing a more 
comprehensive analysis of the NATO discourse. The already mentioned context of the media 
climate in Russia, but also the Russia-NATO history, is seen as context necessary to study 
before doing the analysis of the articles.  
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Hence, the following chapter will offer crucial background information. Chapter 
two, The Russian media, will create a backdrop for the analysis by assessing the Russian 
media. Here, the thesis will look at the development that has led to the situation of lack of 
press freedom in Russia today and the implications this have for the analysis of the articles.  
Chapter three, Russia-NATO relations will treat relevant aspects of the Russian 
foreign policy in terms of its relationship with NATO. It will further offer a historical 
overview of the Russia-NATO relationship. In comparison to chapter two, the third chapter 
will go much more in depth, as understanding the development of the Russia-NATO 
relationship is perceived as invaluable for the analysis. 
The core part of this thesis is chapter four The NATO debate. This chapter is 
divided in two, and consists of Part 1: Main concerns, 2004-2010 and Part 2: Analysis of the 
debate. The first part will present an overview of the debate’s main concerns. It will also treat 
the newspapers’ profiles and serve as an introduction to the more in depth analysis of the 
debate, which follows in the chapter’s second part. Here, the analysis of the NATO debate 
will be presented, and the main perspectives and views on NATO and Russia’s relationship 
with the alliance will discussed and analyzed. 
In chapter five, Conclusion, I will discuss the results of the study, and look at the 
main perspectives on the alliance in the NATO discourse in the Russian newspapers. I will 
comment on how these can contribute to a better understanding of Russia’s relationship with 
the alliance.  
Not all the articles studied for the analysis are referred to directly in this text. 
Therefore, there is an overview of the articles not referred to in the thesis in the Appendix, 
which follows at the very end of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Theoretical approach 
The aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of the Russian view of NATO in order 
to easier comprehend its relationship with the alliance. As this will be done by analyzing 
articles from Russian newspapers, some aspects of text analysis are worth emphasizing. 
Therefore, in the following I will look at the term text and discourse to clarify some basic 
principles. 
Firstly, text can be understood in both wide and narrow terms. A narrow approach 
sees text as being communicative actions within an apparent text genre where the theme is 
clear to the recipient. In its wider sense, text is understood as being any action that the 
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recipient interprets as having a communicative meaning (Brekke 2006: 19-20). The texts used 
in my analysis are written texts within a defined genre, as they are all articles from 
newspapers. It is also clear who has produced the text, as well as who the recipients are. 
Secondly, the term discourse can be said to mainly be understood in two senses.   
First, as defined by Vivien Burr (2003: 202), the term discourse is used “to refer to a 
systematic, coherent set of images, metaphors and so on that construct on object in a 
particular way”. In other words, a discourse describes a certain way to understand the world 
and our reality – or parts of it (Jørgensen and Phillips 1999: 9). The other way in which the 
term is used is “to refer to the actual spoken interchanges between people” (Burr 2003: 202). 
A discourse is in its first sense an expressed way of understanding reality, while in the other 
sense it is understood as one certain conversation or a defined communicative action.  
Thus, text analysis is to make sense of these communicative interchanges. And a 
discourse analysis is one way to go about it. Again drawing on Burr (Burr 2003: 202) 
discourse analysis can be described as: “the analysis of a piece of text in order to reveal either 
the discourse operating within it or the linguistic and rhetorical devises that are used in its 
construction”. The analysis that Burr here describes is a two-level analysis. Either one can 
search for the discourse itself, finding what arguments and meaning a certain discourse 
contains, or one can go deeper into the linguistic structures of that discourse. As will be 
described more in detail later, in my analysis I will not break down the discourse in a 
linguistic sense, but rather look for the patterns of argumentation in the debate about NATO 
in Russia.  
Furthermore, as the thesis’ analysis of Russian perspectives on NATO is a study 
of articles written in Russian newspapers, it may be worth making some comments on the 
aspect of media discourse. In our everyday life we are surrounded by the media, with news 
being brought to us through a variety of channels. This constant flow of information, which 
shapes our image of reality, is also adapted and shaped to suit our perception of our world. In 
the words of Donald Matheson (2005: 6): “Journalists, talkshow hosts, soap opera 
scriptwriters, among others, all seek to construe the world in ways that will make sense to the 
wider public, mixing together specialists voices and translating them into common 
knowledge”. Even though the makers of the communicative message in the media rely on the 
already existing images of reality, the relationship between media and the public is not a 
balanced one as such. One reason being that “while on one level the meanings that are found 
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in the media are shared, the power to make those shared meanings is not shared” (Matheson 
2005: 2).  
Discourse analysis is an approach to text and reality that has roots in social 
constructivism. The constructivist approach to reality can be said to be a response to the 
realist and liberalist perceptions of the mechanisms that explain how the world works 
Jørgensen and Phillips (1999: 13). The social constructivist perception of an interrelation 
between discourses and our perception of reality is one of the main elements in Norman 
Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. By using some of Fairclough’s main principles from 
his approach to DA, the analysis of the debate about NATO can be put within an analytical 
framework. It is important to note, however, that my analysis uses Fairclough’s critical DA as 
a point of departure, not as a theoretical and methodical guide that is followed point-to-point. 
This means that I use the main principles of a critical DA and adapt these in order to address 
my research question. Fairclough’s focus on knowledge of the context in which text is 
produced and discourses are made, suits the aim of my analysis well. Therefore, the term “text 
in context” creates an illustrating image of why the principles of DA can be seen as suitable 
for analysing the articles from Russian newspapers (Brekke 2006: 21).  
Concerning his empirical approach to a critical DA, Fairclough’s point of 
departure is that of a three layered method, where a) text, b) discourse practice, and c) social 
practice, constitute the main areas of research. On text level he is interested in linguistics and 
the arguments used in the piece of text that is analysed. On a discourse practice level, the area 
of interest is the process of production and consumption of the text. When it comes to the 
level of social practice, Fairclough’s form of DA is concerned with the role the text plays in 
the social world and in order to fully comprehend this level, Fairclough believes that 
analysing a text is not enough. One has to apply other areas of research to get a 
comprehensive understanding of a text and its context. It is these principles of how the 
context has an effect on the making of the text, which may be said to be relevant for my 
analysis. The model described above may be seen as a backdrop and is adopted to suit my 
analysis of the articles.  
 
1.3 Methodical approach 
The reason for adopting the principles of a DA, is to be able to take the context in which the 
articles have been written into consideration when doing the analysis. Analyzing the debate 
about NATO between 2004 and 2010, without taking into account the context in which the 
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articles are written, would leave out valuable insight. Insight which may lead to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the NATO discourse in Russian newspapers, as well as a 
broader understanding of the main perceptions both on the alliance and on its relationship 
with Russia.  
In terms of Fairclough’s model described above, what he refers to as level one 
(text level), constitute the thesis’ main sources, the articles I have collected for this study. 
Further, what he refers to as level two (discourse practice), which is the context where the 
articles are produced and read in, is in my analysis understood as the media climate in Russia. 
Due to the governmental control and lack of press freedom in the country, it is necessary to 
consider under what circumstances the articles have been produced in. This way, the articles 
will be treated from the perspective that they are contributions to the debate, shaped by the 
Russian media culture.  
The third level (social practice), is in this analysis seen as the Russia-NATO 
relationship that the articles refer to. The relationship is seen as an important context for the 
articles in terms of crucial events that has shaped the NATO discourse, but also in terms of 
the images and perspectives on the alliance, which has been established through the history of 
the relationship.  
Thus, understanding the media environment in which the articles are created, is 
seen as an important aspect of the analysis. So is the history of the Russia-NATO relationship. 
This is why, as illustrated in the outline of the thesis, this study will offer one background 
chapter discussing the Russian media climate and its implications for the analysis, and one 
chapter treating the relationship between Russian and NATO. Thus, the practical conduct of 
the analysis will not be a three step analysis of each article, but the context will be discussed 
beforehand to shape a backdrop for the analysis. 
 
1.3.1 Collecting sources  
The process of collecting sources for this thesis has been implemented on two different levels. 
The first was acquiring sources on background information on Russia’s relationship with 
NATO and on the media climate in the country. The second level was that of collecting 
relevant articles from the newspapers. 
In terms of acquiring background information on Russian media, the goal was to 
gather secondary sources which could give explanations to why the media climate in Russia 
has developed the way it has, and also give a description of where the country stands today in 
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terms of press freedom. Extensive literature on this subject is available, thus one of the 
challenges was to choose sources that would be of relevance to this study. Particularly 
relevant has been information concerned with how the Russian government has taken a 
growing interest in controlling and using the media for its own purpose. Further, the thesis 
treats newspapers in particular, hence, the newspaper industry has been of special interest. In 
addition, it was one of the thesis’ goals to choose three newspapers, which would be expected 
to differ from each other. The use of secondary sources contributed to the selection of these 
papers. 
A number of studies have been written on the Russia-NATO relationship. 
Therefore, one of the major challenges has been to get an overview of the literature and the 
different explanations given in terms of the path Russia has taken in relations to the alliance 
the last years. In order to understand the Russian debate about NATO between 2004 and 
2010, there is a need to grasp the political situation as it was at this time. However, images of 
NATO in Russia are linked to the time of the Cold War and the division of the world between 
NATO and the members of the Warsaw Pact. Hence, during the study of the debate, it has 
been necessary also to look at the time long before the timeframe set for the analysis. Overall, 
accessing this literature was not very challenging, however, limiting it in terms of relevance to 
this study, was. In addition, using secondary sources both from Western as well as Russian 
experts was considered important, as this was expected to give a more diverse image of the 
Russia-NATO relationship. Further, taking into consideration Russian expert opinions on 
these matters might draw attention to perspectives that would make it easier to understand the 
opinions put forth in the Russian debate. 
The second level of collecting sources has been executed in the search of relevant 
newspapers and articles for the analysis. In terms of the three newspapers, the choice fell on 
newspapers expected to be representing, at least to a certain degree, different perspectives on 
NATO. This resulted in choosing Rossiskaya Gazeta (RG), Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) and 
Novaya Gazeta (Novaya). Rossiskaya Gazeta is a governmental newspaper representing the 
official line. Due to its official status, RG serves as a point of departure in the analysis in 
terms of debate and whether the views set forth in the other two newspapers coincide with, or 
are in opposition to the official views on NATO issues. NG is a newspaper broadly perceived 
to be fairly independent, while Novaya is probably one of the most critical national 
newspapers in Russia today.  
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The main challenge in terms of collecting sources on this level has been that of 
searching for relevant articles. The newspapers I have chosen are all national with online 
editions, which reflect to a large degree the paper editions, although some of the newspapers 
might do some adjustments in respect to the printed versus the electronic articles. However, I 
have chosen to use online articles as these have been fairly easy to access.  
The different newspapers, however, have quite different web sites and varying 
possibilities to search for and find relevant articles. First, RG’s online edition has a rather 
advanced system for making an article search, where you can limit it both after words in the 
text and in the headline, as well as limiting a search by for example local, business or 
weekend editions. Furthermore, the online paper also has its own NATO-tag, or link, where 
articles written about NATO are gathered in one place. In addition it has sub groups such as 
“NATO and enlargement” and “NATO and Russia”. I started out looking at the articles under 
the “NATO and Russia”-tag, but expanded the search for the overall NATO-tag as this gave 
an extended image of the debate. As a requirement, the articles had to be from a federal 
edition to be analyzed. Articles that were from regional or other editions, including special 
internet editions were excluded due to considerations in terms of including articles that were 
available to as many readers as possible.  
Second, NG also had a NATO-tag which made the search easier. However, it had 
not divided these into sub groups, which means that everything that has been written about 
NATO during 2004-2010 is all collected here. This paper without a doubt had the largest 
amount of articles on the subject; an example is the year 2008 when the total number was 232 
articles, while in RG the number was 59. As each article was represented with a headline and 
an introductory paragraph, it was fairly easy to get an impression on whether the article would 
be relevant or not. The articles chosen from this paper were mainly from the “Politics” 
section. This is an own section in the standard printed edition of the paper, but there is also an 
extended version that comes with the basic paper twice a month. For this paper I chose not to 
analyze those articles that were especially written for the online edition, as these then would 
not be available to those who did not have access to the printed edition.   
Third, Novaya did not have a NATO-tag and it was not possible to do a word 
search at the same time as you limited the search for a time period. The option was either to 
go through all the editions from 2004 until 2010, or to do a word search for NATO and a year, 
such as “NATO 2005”. Then articles about NATO, which were either written in 2005 or 
referring to 2005, would emerge as the result. This proved itself to be the most successful 
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method. However, there were no headlines visible and little text to each link, and therefore I 
was forced to access every article before deciding whether the topic was relevant. But, unlike 
the previous papers, Novaya did not have the same amount of articles to search through.
3
 
The results of the analysis of the NATO debate in the Russian newspapers are 
presented in chapter four, and constitute this thesis’ main part. As the articles are all (with 
very few exceptions) written in Russian, this paper offers insight in a debate that displays 
perspectives on NATO and Russia’s relationship with the alliance, which otherwise would not 
be easy accessible. This thesis’ main contribution is insight on the debate about NATO in 
Russian articles and it will demonstrate these perspectives by the use of examples. Due to 
how this thesis’ main sources are written in Russian, the examples and the quotes used to 
illustrate the analysis’ main founds are all my translations. The original articles are referred to 





As with most studies, there are several challenges to this particular one. First, there is the 
already discussed media climate in Russia and the lack of press freedom. This is linked to the 
question asked about to what extent there is a debate in Russian newspapers, due to the 
governmental control. It also serves as the already mentioned context seen as important in 
order to give a comprehensive analysis of the NATO discourse. Therefore, the Russian media 
environment will be treated more in detail in chapter two.  
Second, there is also the aspect of limitations due to representativeness in terms of 
reducing the number of articles to fit the timeframe set for this project. This has by far been 
one of the greatest challenges for this study. Furthermore, limiting the search in number 
according to relevance can be said to be one of the major pitfalls of a study such as this, as 
what is seen as relevant is linked to what one would like to find, and what questions one 
wants answered. However, it was necessary to limit the number of articles due to the 
extensive number available, and the process took shape while doing the search. In the initial 
                                                 
3
 Towards the end of the project Novaya Gazeta`s web page had been given upgrade, which also included its 
search function. Thus, the method described in the following was executed in the old layout of the web site, 
resulting in a different approach than what it would be if the search had been done after the new site was 
launched (29.10.2011).  
4
 Articles from RG are referred to as from rg.ru, while articles from NG are referred to by ng.ru and Novaya by 
novayagazeta.ru. The date of when each article was written will also be referred to, both in the text and in the 
bibliography, for example: (ng.ru 2008.12.08). The link to this particular article may then be found under the 




years, some issues were noticeably more frequently treated than others, and combined with 
background knowledge on the period this created a platform where I could continue the 
further search from. It was desirable to see the development on the main issues in the debate; 
therefore I followed up on these, adding new topics as they became relevant during the 
period.  
However, focusing on issues that seem relevant, or on articles expected to give 
valuable insight on the perspectives on the alliance, might result in choosing an article with 
the headline “Do we need NATO?” and not the one which states possible killings of civilians 
due to a NATO mission in Afghanistan. This might lead to losing articles with relevant 
comments on NATO. Further, going through the hundreds of articles written on this subject, 
one will probably find a number of different angles and perspectives on each topic. However, 
the main goal of this study has been to find perspectives and arguments which are not just 
stated once, but show a clear trend and create an apparent pattern. Therefore, the aim has been 
to read and analyze articles that do not just state facts about a certain meeting or about a 
project where NATO and Russia cooperate. Of special interest have been articles such as 
those labelled “opinion”, “remarks” and “comments”.  
In total, for this study I have read and analyzed 206 articles. The number of 
articles for each year and each newspaper has varied, as it has been dependent on the number 
of relevant articles, and their length. The distribution between the years is fairly even as can 
be seen by this overview: in 2004 I read 31 articles in total, in 2005 the number was 27, while 
for 2006 I read 28. The year 2007 also resulted in 28 articles, and 2008 in 37. For the year 
2009 it was 29 and for 2010 it was 26. 
Third, another aspect in terms of challenges to the study is the question of how 
many people actually read the newspapers and how the perspectives put forth in the articles 
reflect the overall opinion. According to Oates and McCormick (White, Sakwa and Hale 
2010: 128) a survey on the media use in Russia for the year 2008 showed that the number of 
people who read national newspapers routinely was 18 percent. 38 percent answered that they 
read them some times, while 30 percent seldom read them and 13 percent never even picked 
them up. This overview only included paper editions. The use of internet in relations to media 
was represented by a separate question in this survey. To this question 12 percent answered 
that they use internet in a media context routinely, while 61 percent answered never.  
The aspect of representation in terms of who actually participate in the NATO 
debate by reading the articles is of course necessary to highlight. However, this is not an 
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opinion survey; it is an analysis of the perspectives put forth in the public press. One may still 
claim, however, that some aspects of the overall NATO debate in Russia plays into the NATO 
discourse in the Russian newspapers, and vice versa. As described earlier, there is a 
correlation between those who create and those who are exposed to the images in media 
discourses. However, while the power to impose perspectives upon the recipient belongs to 
the media, the images in the newspapers must make sense and to the reader and reflect their 
perception on the subject. Thus, the NATO discourse in the Russian newspapers, and the 
perspectives put forth on the alliance in the articles, can be seen as a part of a larger NATO 
discourse in Russia.  
This thesis will only be studying parts of the NATO discourse in articles from 
three Russian newspapers. However, the opinions and arguments put forth in the articles and 

















Chapter two: The Russian media  
 
2.0 Lack of press freedom 
The importance of understanding the context, in which the debate about NATO in the Russian 
newspapers takes place, has already been emphasized. Therefore, in the following, 
explanations on the development of a state controlled media climate will be given and the 
implications this might have for the analysis discussed. The media situation as we know it in 
Russia today has been influenced by the Soviet media culture, which cannot be said to have 
provided the Russian media with a solid base from which to prosper. Further, with the 
economic crisis of the 1990s and the challenges of transforming from a socialist state to a new 
system, the Russian media climate has developed into an instrument for economic as well as 
political actors.  
The non-profit organization Reporters Without Borders placed Russia on a pitiful 
140
th
 place in its Press Freedom Index from 2010, where 178 countries were evaluated 
(RFS.org). Joining Russia in this part of the index are countries such as Turkey and Ethiopia 




 place respectively, while Malaysia and Brunei 
followed directly behind. The evaluation stems from a study where a number of factors 
contributing to creating an environment for press freedom are assessed in each country. The 
study looks at the existence of censorship and self-censorship, the threat of physical violence 
for journalists and whether there are incidences where journalists are murdered or attacked. 
They also assess whether indirect threats have been made or if there is a judicial or 
administrative pressure on the media. There is also an assessment on whether there is a lack 
of access to information needed to provide objective news coverage. Russia’s placement on 
the index indicates the lack of press freedom in the country. 
In an article first published in The Wall Street Journal in November 2010, the 
Russian journalist Elena Milashina writes about the challenges she and her colleges have met 
in their attempt to provide independent news coverage in the newspaper Novaya Gazeta 
(HRW.org). According to her, press freedom in Russia is close to extinct, and those still 
fighting for independence run the risk of being harmed. The fact that five journalist from her 
newspaper have been killed in the past ten years, including the much covered murder of Anna 
Politkovskaya in 2006, is to her proof enough that there are strong forces operating, trying to 
keep a lid on those offering critical views on Kremlin’s misdeeds. 
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Indeed, the situation for journalists in Russia has long been criticized by 
organizations fighting for the rights of reporters around the world, and the country has been 
characterised as one of the most dangerous countries for journalists to work in (Hønneland 
and Jørgensen 2006: 135). The attacks and murders on journalists as well as the lack of 
transparency in the investigations, or even the lack of investigation in itself, contribute to the 
strained climate in which Russian media operates. This can be said to reflect the overall lack 
of transparency which influences and threatens civil society as a whole in Russia. How did the 
situation of lack of press freedom become as severe as it is today? There are different 
explanations for this, and in the following I will look at some relevant factors in the process of 
shaping the media climate in Russia. 
 
2.1 The development of Russia’s information climate 
In stark contrast to the situation during most of the time of the Soviet Union, where in the 
words of de Smaele (2010: 1300): “a limited flow of information was the norm”, Gorbachev’s 
reforms were followed by a prosperous time for the media business. His reforms of 
perestroika (reorganization) and glasnost (openness) from the mid 1980s contributed to an 
environment in which the number of actors of press media reached a distinct peak. From 1980 
to 1990 the number of all editions of printed newspapers and journals jointly in Russia, went 
from 2488 million to 5010 million. In the following years, however, the number plummeted, 
and in 1995 the number was down to 299 million (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006: 133). This 
downward development can to a large extent be explained in economic terms, as the 
economic crisis experienced by the Russian Federation during the 1990s also had a huge 
impact on the media industry.  
During the transformation in the 1990s in post-Soviet Russia, there was an 
ongoing fight for economic and political power, where the media industry ended up playing 
an important part in this battle for influence. This is the reason why Solder (White 2008: 158) 
sees the media culture that developed in Russia during the Boris Yeltsin’s reign in the 90s as a 
result of “political capitalism”.5 By using this term, Soldner wants to highlight the process of 
transformation and conversion of political power into economic power. This is seen as the 
result of the challenging process of transformation from a socialistic state to a market oriented 
                                                 
5
 The term “political capitalism” was originally used by Max Weber to describe ancient societies in the Far East, 
but Soldner finds the term useful in his analysis of the transformation process of the Soviet states from socialism 




system. What is peculiar with the Russian case, in his eyes, is the circularity of this process. 
By this he means that there was also a transformation of economic power into political power. 
The consequences that follows from such a system is that it “suppresses the emergence and 
establishment of alternative societal actors, such as political parties, trade unions, independent 
mass media and NGOs” (White 2008 : 160). 
A system where the media was seen as essential in the process of gaining more 
political as well as economic power was established during this period. This created an 
environment where the different incentives, economic or political, were difficult to separate 
from each other. As a consequence, the importance of media outlets grew. According to 
Soldner (White 2008: 157) on a national level, the newspapers and magazines almost 
exclusively belonged to a commercial structure. This meant that it was different “big 
business” that divided the media market amongst them. De Smaele (2007: 1309) also 
recognizes this structure, and sees Yeltsin’s Russia as a “corporate or oligarchic system” 
where Yeltsin had the role of a mediator between the different groups fighting for power, 
consisting of bankers, media tycoons, business people, bureaucrats and politicians. A system 
where the media was supposed to serve both political and economic interests had been 
established.  
Throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency there were both continuities and changes 
in the media climate in Russia in respect to the system that had developed throughout the 
difficult 90s. In contrast to how the situation was in Russia during the first decade after the 
Soviet Union collapsed, the period that followed has been characterized by a shift where the 
economic aspect became less important, whereas the political side of the media industry has 
been treated with a growing interest. For example, media outlets owned by businessmen 
whose views were considered being hostile to the Russian leadership, were brought down and 
new Kremlin-friendly forces have stepped in to take their place. The structural change that 
followed with the new president is described by Olessia Koltsova (2006: 43) in these terms: 
Vladimir Putin’s accession to power marked the decline of the epoch of CIGs6 and 
the new consolidation of the state. It also brought more stable rules of the game, 
both their formal and informal institutionalization. Renationalization of major media 
was a part of a broader policy of the Federal elite to concentrate various power 
recourses in its hands. 
                                                 
6
 Cross-Institutional Groups (CIGs) is a term used by Koltsova, referring to power groups often holding share of 




In addition to the consolidation of state controlled or owned media channels, the government 
has both direct and indirect ways of controlling the flow of information in the country. As 
stated by de Smaele (2007: 1304) in terms of direct control over institutions of mass media, 
the influence of the Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication can be seen as one of the 
most important. And further, in terms of indirect control the media outlets’ dependence on the 
state is exploited as they rely on licenses, facilities such as printing houses, and in financial 
terms in forms of subsidies or sponsorship (de Smaele 2007: 1304).  
In addition to the development of a media culture influenced by economic as well 
as political incentives, another factor seen as having contributed to the existing media climate 
in Russia today, is the flaws and shortcomings of Russian media law. The existing laws on 
media in Russia are criticized for being contradictory and for giving too much room for 
maneuvering by those trying to control the flow of information. It is also criticized for a lack 
of laws, leaving areas open for questions (White 2008: 164). In addition to these 
shortcomings, de Smaele (2007: 1300) is concerned with the media culture with a distinct 
division between de jure and de facto positions on the law. She believes that while both the 
1993 Constitution as well as the 1991 Russian federation Law on Mass Media gives a de jure 
right to access to information, there is a de facto restrain on the flow of information. This has 
lead to a media culture where personal networks matters to an even larger extent for Russian 
journalists seeking information, than in most countries with a higher level of press freedom. 
When trying to explain why this environment has established itself and developed in this 
direction, factors such as lack of distinct boundaries between the subsystems of politics, 
economy, law and media are seen as central (de Smaele 2007: 1309). 
 
2.2 Information as power 
Looking at the situation in today’s Russia, Sarah Oates and Gillian McCormack (White, 
Sakwa and Hale 2010: 118) points at the paradox of the amount of information provided in 
the Russian media, versus the lack of democracy in society. The number of media companies 
in Russia after the mid 1990s has increased, while diversity and pluralism - which one should 
think would increase as a natural consequence of this development - has decreased. Oates and 
McCormack (White, Sakwa and Hale 2010: 118) highlight how the idea of the media as 
“objective” or “balanced” has never been widely accepted in Russia. They see this as a result 
of multiple factors, such as the use of media by the political elite, the acceptance by journalist 
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to this lack of professional balance and objectivity, as well as how the public seem to accept 
this unbiased and politically shaped form for flow of information in Russia. 
Looking at the development of the Russian media climate, it is obvious that the 
Russian government has decided to use control over the distribution of news and other 
information to their advantage. The numerous mechanisms of controlling the flow of 
information speak for itself. As already mentioned, the situation for Russian journalists is 
seen as outright dangerous. Criticisms of Russian authorities can turnout even to be deadly. 
However, de Smaele (2007: 1304) is of the opinion that the role of the owners of media 
outlets must also be seen as contributing to the media climate. It is not the authorities alone 
that have created this environment, and the way many journalist accept the traditions of 
Russian journalism, is a contributing factor to the existing media climate in Russia. 
In most democratic countries, the country’s mass media is seen as a “fourth 
power” and a contributor of unbiased information. There is an agreement on those assessing 
the situation in Russia that as of today the information climate does not live up to these 
standards (de Smaele 2007: 1310, White 2008: 172). To illustrate the situation today is an 
interview with a journalist from Novaya Gazeta after an episode where several students at the 
Institute for Journalism at the University in Moscow were excluded from a lecture, where 
president Dmitri Medvedev had come to talk about foreign policy the fall of 2011. Vera 
Kitchanova, who is both a student at the University and working for Novaya, was not just 
denied access to the auditorium but also had to spend hours at a police station due to her 
expressed wish to ask Medvedev critical questions. According to her, it is a “democratic 
problem” in Russia today “that the fourth state power is to be forced into silence in this way” 
(Aftenposten, Salo: 2011.10.28). 
 
2.3 Implications for the analysis 
Knowing what environment the articles chosen for this study’s analysis are written in, is of 
major importance. It helps understand their profiles and their positions in the landscape of a 
number of contributions to the printed press in Russia today. It may therefore be worth taking 
a quick look at each of the three chosen papers in terms of the media climate described above. 
First, Rossiskaya Gazeta may be seen as a tool for the Russian government to 
reach out to the public. The perspectives presented on NATO and Russia’s relationship with 
the alliance here, must be seen as reflecting the views the Russian government wants its 
recipient to read about this topic. Second, both Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta have 
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profiles that emphasize their wish to be independent and, thus, offer perspectives that may be 
in contrast to, and offer critique to the official perspectives. As will be described and 
discussed more in depth in chapter four, there are indeed noticeable differences between the 
papers and their articles, and a definite sense of contrasting views. This also includes sharp 
critique of the Russian government. To illustrate this, an example from Novaya may be used. 
The article concerns the foreign minister of US, Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Vilnius in 2005, 
where she met with members of the Belorussian opposition. After the meeting she named 
Belarus the last dictatorship of Europe, a statement the article commented by pointing out that 
this meant that “either Putin is not a dictator or Russia is no longer a part of Europe” 
(Novayagazeta.ru 2005.04.25). Such comments points to a certain level of open critique 
towards the Russian leadership. Even though outright criticism may be more frequently 
observed in articles from Novaya, there are several articles that offer critique on Russia’s 
leadership in NG too, displaying clear signs of debate. Still, an official paper, such as RG, 
does not have to be governmental friendly in every aspect. However, RG is still loyal to the 
Russian leadership and, thus, displays a clear sign of the control the Russian government has 
on this paper.  
Nevertheless, the fact that there are indeed rather significant differences between 
the two more independent newspapers and the governmental paper, their contributions to the 
debate may be seen as contrasting the image of a state controlled press as described above. 
One reason why the debate in the newspapers to a certain degree can seem surprisingly free in 
terms of the expected restrains, may be seen in relations to the relatively low number of 
people in Russia reading newspapers on a regular basis. Instead of reading newspapers, 
watching TV is the major source of news and information in Russia. According Oates and 
McCormick (White, Sakwa and Hale 2010: 127) a survey from 2007 showed that in contrast 
to the 18 percent referred to in the introduction that in 2008 read newspapers routinely, 74 
percent answered the same for television. Therefore, control over newspaper outlets may be 
said to have less effect in terms of political influence than controlling the TV channels. The 
Russian government seems to have taken the consequences of this, as it has a strong control 
over TV, while newspapers are allowed to act more freely. In addition, it might be worth 
noting how internet and social networks, such as twitter, are not being under governmental 
control, which has created a new channel for expressing oppositional views (Aftenposten, 
Tjønn: 2011.11.02). Thus, while few read the papers, the impression of a controlled media in 
Russia might be nuanced in terms of the relatively free printed press. This is not to say that 
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there is no control, because there are clearly many examples of it, but that the government’s 
focus on controlling media in relations to TV, may explain the level of debate in Novaya and 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta.  
Having discussed the Russian media climate as a level of context needed to grasp 
in order to analyse perspectives on NATO in the Russian newspapers; the next chapter treats 






















Chapter three: Russia-NATO relations 
 
3.0 Russia’s relationship with NATO 
This chapter aims to create a backdrop for the analysis of the debate about NATO. In terms of 
background information on the relationship between Russia and NATO, both the history of 
these relations and the underlying mechanisms of Russia’s foreign policy, are of importance. 
There have been many attempts by researchers to understand the driving forces behind 
Russian foreign policy. Even though their approaches might draw on different perspectives on 
how the world works and how states relate to each other, there seems to be some basic 
assumptions that are agreed upon concerning the nature of Russia. One aspect recognized as a 
major driving force in Russia’s foreign and security policy is the perceived image of Russia as 
an important player at the international arena. In the following I take a closer look at the 
feature of Russia’s identity linked to its aspirations of being a great power. This is closely 
linked to its relationship with the West and to its relationship with countries in its “near 
abroad”, which will be treated respectively. Following the description of some of these 
underlying driving forces, the chapter further looks at the development of Russia-NATO 
relations, from when the alliance was established after the Second World War until the end of 
2010. In order to see the NATO discourse in Russia in a broader perspective, the chapter will 
also offer some short comments on the public opinion on NATO in Russia. At the end of this 
chapter, in order to sum up and prepare for the analysis, which follows in chapter four, the 
most important events in the Russia-NATO relationship will be discussed and seen in 
relations to relevant features of Russia’s foreign policy. 
 
3.1 Great power aspirations 
Some aspects of Russia’s identity will be treated in the following, due to how identity, in the 
words of Valentina Feklyunina (2008: 607), “is seen as one of the key concepts in explaining 
why a country takes particular actions at the international arena”. The term identity is seen as 
that which describes the shared perspective held in Russia concerning its role in the world. 
Using the term identity when discussing the development of Russian foreign policy, there is a 
need to note that it is mainly the elite’s perspectives on Russia’s identity that influence this 
policy. Furthermore, choices made in this political sphere are made as a result of several 
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factors. However, there seems to be reason to emphasize certain aspects of Russia’s identity, 
as these may be said to be influencing on these decisions. These aspects may also be said to 
be a part of the driving forces of Russian foreign policy, also in terms of its NATO 
relationship. To add to the words of Feklyunina on the influence identity has on political 
choices, the words of Jeffrey Mankoff (2010: 3) can be quoted: 
A state’s identity in the national system – whether it sees itself as a satiated or a 
revisionist power, a nation-state or an empire – provides the intellectual 
framework that shapes decisions about how power is employed. 
 When looking at the development of the Russia-NATO relationship, the image of Russia as a 
mighty player in world politics seems to be relevant. The identity as a great power builds on 
the image of the country being a previous empire with continuous expanding borders, a 
country destined to play a part on the international arena. Therefore, the importance of 
Russia’s past as a tsarist empire and as one of the two poles in the world’s bipolar system 
during the aftermath of the Second World War, continues to play a vital part of the identity in 
Russia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, where Russia went from being a part of a military 
superpower to experiencing both economic and political turmoil, it became of major 
importance to revive the greatness of the past. As stated by Feklyunina (2008: 615-616) 
“positioning Russia as a great power and an independent centre in a multi-polar world became 
one of the most significant elements of Russia’s image projected in the West after the early 
2000s”. These aspirations for playing an important role in world politics are reflected in the 
role Russia wants to have when deciding upon questions related to security politics within the 
Euro-Atlantic zone. James Goldgeier (2010: 10) believes that one significant explanation to 
the challenges in the NATO-Russia relationship stems from this aspiration Russia has to play 
a special role: 
The core problem in NATO-Russia relations can be summed up quite simply: 
NATO will not allow Russia to have a veto over alliance decisions, while Russia 
believes it is a great power deserving a full voice in European security affairs. 
The image of Russia as a great power, and as an equal to Europe and the US can be said to be 
closely linked. Russia’s relationship with the West is also seen as an important aspect of the 
Russian identity, as the West always have served as a point of reference in its definition of 
what Russia is or should be (Feklyunina 2008: 608). The Russian intelligentsia has always 
been preoccupied with defining what is “Russian” in relations to what is seen as “European”. 
As will be discussed in the following, the image of whether Russia is or should be a part of 
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the European community has played an important role in the shaping of Russian foreign 
policy, also in terms of its relationship with NATO. 
 
3.2 Russia and the West 
The political elite in Russia, during both the time when  Russia was a tsarist empire, a part of 
the USSR and during the last two decades as a post-Soviet Russia, has been engaged in the 
question on whether Russia should align itself with the West, or not. This has resulted in 
different directions within the political landscape in Russia.  
With the establishment of a Russian intelligentsia, from the eighteenth century 
and onwards, the debate about Russia`s relationship with the West started to take shape 
(Leatherbarrow and Offord 2010: 47). The debate concerned whether it would be beneficial 
for Russia to look towards the West or not. This was also followed by questions regarding its 
identity, whether Russia was European or Asian – or something separate from them both. The 
two main camps consisted of Westernizers and Slavophiles and have later also been 
accompanied by the Eurasianist approach. 
These schools of thought, and their labels, have gone through changes as the 
political environment has developed, both domestically and at the international level. One 
could divide these approaches into several different sub perspectives, and in the literature on 
the schools of thought in Russia, one finds varying numbers and labels. However, taking a 
look at the three schools’ “core approaches” to Russian identity, can contribute to a better 
understanding of the role the West plays in the Russian identity. In short, the basic view of the 
Westernizers is a common “emphasis on Russia’s similarity with the West” and the 
perspective that the West represents “the most viable and progressive civilization in the 
world” (Tsygankov 2010:4). Hence, following the European model in terms of culture, values 
and in the making of institutions, would in their eyes result in a more progressive and 
modernized Russian state (Legvold 2007: 108). There have been several approaches 
concerning what elements of the Western model that has been seen as favourable to Russia. 
According to Vera Tolz (2003: 82), Westernizers have traditionally agreed that “Russia had 
the advantage of being able to pick and chose the best aspects” of the Western heritage. This 
resulted in internal debates which mainly concerned what elements from the West that suited 
best to bring into Russia. 
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In contrast, the Slavophiles have traditionally been concerned with rejecting the 
West as a model for Russia. In their eyes the Russian Orthodox faith, the Russian culture and 
history represented something unique. Russia’s uniqueness was seen as something the country 
ought to develop further, and not to be changed by Western influence. Further, the 
Slavophiles’ rejection of the West to a large degree regarded the Western institutions, which 
they believed Russia would be better off without (Tolz 2003: 82). 
Eurasianism is a perspective that can be said to offer a view that in some aspects 
represents a path for Russia between that sought by the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. As 
can be guessed from its name, it reflects an image of Russia’s identity and its foreign policy 
as “linked to its geographic position at the crossroads between Europe and Asia” (Mankoff 
2009: 65). The Eurasianist approach to Russia’s relationship with the West has in time 
developed into a perspective which sees the West with suspicious eyes. This approach has 
also been influenced by great power aspirations and the aspect of Russia’s identity as an 
empire. At the same time, Eurasianists have traditionally perceived the world as polar, divided 
by the power struggle between Russia and the US along with Britain (Tolz 2003: 126). 
However, the Eurasianist approach has split into several directions and the views of the 
extreme and the democratic Eurasianists are far from each other. While the extreme version is 
seen as more or less anti-Western, the mild version of this approach “favour close cooperation 
with Europe and the United States” (Legvold 2007: 111). However, even the mild forms of 
Eurasianism still hold the perspective that Europe and the US should not be Russia’s top 
priority. This status belongs to the areas made up by the previous Soviet republics (Legvold 
2009:111).  
The influence these approaches have had in the making of Russia’s foreign policy 
will be commented as part of the discussion on the different phases of the Russia-NATO 
history, later in this chapter. The point to be made here, then, is the importance of the West as 
a point of reference in Russia’s quest on forming its identity. Whether this is part of a social 
constructivist explanation of how the “national Selves” are created due to interaction with the 
significant “other”7 or as an explanation with a geopolitical focus, the importance of the West 
is nonetheless obvious. In the words of Jeffrey Mankoff (2009: 26): 
How Russia defines itself with relation to the West is in many ways the country`s 
key foreign policy question. The relationship will continue to play a central role in 
determining the nature of Russia’s interactions with other countries and central 
                                                 
7
 See Tsygankov (2010: 14-21) for further explanations to the social constructivist view on the development of 
Russia`s foreign policy. 
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international institutions. Even if Russia`s leaders do not see their country as 
belonging to the West in some fundamental way, their foreign policy has none the 
less inevitably been Western-centric. 
The relationship Russia has had with the West since after the Second World War is reflected 
in its relationship with NATO, and the chapter will treat the different periods where the 
relationship has flourished or stagnated shortly. However, there is one more aspect that is 
worth giving attention in terms of Russia’s identity and choices it has made in international 
politics, and that is the importance of the areas of the “near abroad”.  
 
3.3 Russia and the “near abroad” 
The term “near abroad” is used in reference to countries perceived as having a special 
connection to Russia through language, history and culture, often meaning the states of the 
Soviet Union. Jeffry Mankoff (2010: 7) sees Russia’s attempt to remain the leading influential 
force in this region as a struggle that is strongly linked to the ambition of being a great power. 
Within this region, Russia views itself as having a unique role and that this ought to be 
reflected in its influence in these areas. The way it has pursued its visions for these countries 
has varied depending on its economic situation, its domestic challenges and the changes in 
international politics.  
These countries have, since the fall of the USSR, been the ones who directly have 
felt the growing assertive foreign policy in Russia. After a steady economic growth during the 
first decade of the millennium, the assertiveness of Russia’s foreign policy could be seen both 
from the gas dispute with Ukraine in 2006 and the war with Georgia two years later, episodes 
that will be treated more in detail later. As pointed out by Lawrence T. Caldwell (Legvold 
2007: 313) the attempt to “staunch the flow of Moscow’s ebbing influence” in these areas 
started as early as in 1991, and has continued up until today. However, Margot Light (White, 
Sakwa and Hale 2010: 231-232) points out that even though the areas have been stated of 
being of major interest, “in practice, however, little multilateral integration has been 
achieved”. In addition, Russia has had different relationships with the different countries, as is 
pointed out by Mankoff (2009:243): 
The European republics (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, plus the three Baltic states) 
have served as a buffer zone between Russia and the expanding Europe and the EU 
and NATO. The Caucasus and the Central-Asia, on the other hand, have been 
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important to Moscow initially as a zone of instability and insecurity along Russia`s 
vulnerable southern frontier.  
As can be seen from this quote, the “near abroad” consist of two groups. The first being the 
Western states which historically has served as buffer zones to the West, and in many aspects 
still continues to do so. The other group serves as a border to the south and its importance has 
varied in terms of the problems caused to Russia in this area. The two different groups, thus, 
pose different possibilities and threats for Russia, and hence are treated differently. 
Furthermore, while Russia’s closest partner is Belarus, the relationships with the 
Baltic countries has traditionally been seen as difficult. However, in the past years Russia’s 
relationship with both Ukraine and Georgia has also been seen as strained. Due to the color 
revolutions in 2003 and 2004, in Georgia and Ukraine respectively, Russia’s relationship with 
these two countries has “become far more difficult” (White, Sakwa and Hale 2010: 236).  
When discussing the “near abroad” this is often related to the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the 
CIS was established by Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Shortly after, the rest of the previous 
republics also joined the CIS, except the three Baltic countries and Georgia. Georgia, 
however, became a member two years later in 1993, but decided to exit the Commonwealth 
again in 2008. In addition, Turkmenistan is only an associate member and Ukraine has not 
ratified the treaty it was a part of creating (Remington 2006: 12, White, Sakwa and Hale 
2010: 232).  The CIS also cooperates within the field of security, and in 1992 the countries 
signed a security treaty which was upgraded in 2002 to the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) (White, Sakwa and Hale 2010: 233). Despite the different attempts to 
cooperate with the countries in the region and to hold on to what has been named Russia’s 
unique “sphere of influence”, Dmitri Trenin points at how these countries “are moving ever 
farther from Moscow” (Trenin 2011). He sees this development as a result of Russia’s foreign 
policy, where it has pushed “these countries away from its imperial embrace and toward 
greater independence” (Trenin 2011). As will be described in detail in the thesis next part, the 
analysis of the NATO debate in the Russian newspapers shows that the development of 
previous allies turning away from Russia, is one of the debate’s main concerns. 
 
3.4 The history of the Russia-NATO relationship 
In the following an overview of the history of the Russia-NATO relationship from the Cold 
War up until the end of 2010 will be presented. The reason why the period of the Cold War 
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has been given attention, is that images of NATO in the debate in the newspapers from 2004 
until 2010, are linked to the images of NATO that were established during the Cold War. 
Following the period of the Cold War, from Yelstin to Medvedev, there were 
different waves in the relationship between the alliance and post-Soviet Russia. The events 
that happened during the second presidency of Putin and the first part of Medvedev’s first 
term as president will be treated with special interest, as these create an important platform for 
understanding the debate in the analysis later. 
 
3.4.1 The Cold War 
The Russian perspectives on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are difficult to 
comprehend if its historical context is not treated. Second World War is by the Russians 
named the “great patriotic war” and their efforts and contribution to the victory over Nazi-
Germany still serves as a symbol of Russia’s greatness. An example of the War’s continued 
importance is the annual celebration of Victory Day on the 9
th
 of May. Parades are organized 
through the whole country with that of the military parade on the Red Square in Moscow as 
the most spectacular. The immense losses that were experienced and the suffering of its 
people are often neglected or seen only as a proof of the Russian strength. In the humblest of 
ways, however, this paper understands its limitations and cannot move in to the era of the 
war. However, there is a wish to introduce the events of the Cold War not as a separate part of 
history, but as a continuation of a wartime that left the Soviet Union in a unique situation with 
its sphere of influence larger than ever, and most of Europe battered and frail. 
During the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet Union has been said to 
have acted as though by suffering from the “Barbarossa-syndrome”, meaning that it acted on 
fear of invasion from the capitalist West (Levering et al. 2001: 89). Hence control of buffer 
zones towards Europe as well as being in power of Germany’s fate, was seen as vital. The 
differences between the Soviet Union and the major powers in the West, with the US at the 
front, played out in these crucial years just as the Second World War ended. A new era had 
begun, and for many the famous “iron curtain speech” that Churchill held in March 1946, is 
seen as the starting point. But no matter what exactly marks the point in time when the Cold 
War begun, it is clear that for approximately four decades the world stayed divided in two 
blocs, which seemed only to share a mutual distrust to each other. 
The fear of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology brought countries of the 
West together to form a security alliance: NATO. According to Pechatnov and Edmondson 
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(Levering et al 2001: 143), the formation of NATO had an important effect on the 
development of the Soviet Union: 
It meant a military-political follow-up to the economic division of Europe started by 
the Marshall plan and resulted in the institutionalization of a Western anti-Soviet 
bloc headed by the United States that the Kremlin had tried so hard but ineffectually 
to prevent. 
In the eyes of the Soviet Union, the fact that the US took a lead position within the alliance, 
and that the Scandinavian countries together with Italy and Portugal were welcomed to join, 
while all the countries belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence was kept out, was a sign of 
anti-Soviet forces building up during the late 1940s (Levering et al. 2001: 142-143). 
NATO was established in Washington D.C. in April 1949. The organization 
originally had 12 members
8
 and Article five of the Washington Treaty from 1949 underlines 
its commitment to collective defense of the organization’s members. The article emphasizes 
that an attack on one of the member states is perceived as an attack on all of them.
9
 In 1955 
the communist counter piece to NATO – the Warsaw Pact10 - was established. Its formation 
came as a result of West-Germany’s admission to the North Atlantic security alliance. 
According to Zubok and Pleshakov (1996: 70), the admission of West-Germany into the 
alliance, which meant rearmament and the establishment of the Bundeswehr, was one of 
Stalin’s worst nightmares coming true. It meant that “NATO was on the way of becoming a 
full-fledged military force in Europe” (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 70). Hence, the formation 
of the Warsaw Pact came as a result of the increasingly tense situation, and the need felt by 
the communist bloc to support itself against its capitalist enemies in the West. 
Furthermore, during the period of the Cold War there were several events that can 
be said to matter in the Russia-NATO relationship. However, more important than single 
episodes, was the establishment of an environment influenced by mistrust and the complex 
web of relations between Russia and the West. In 1953 Josef Stalin, the leader whose mere 
persona still causes disputes and raises questions, died and left the Soviet Union and the Cold 
War it was in the midst of, to Nikita Khrushchev. According to Zubok and Pleshakov (1996: 
184-5) Khrushchev sincerely wanted to end the polarization of Europe and believed that 
                                                 
8
 The 12 original members of NATO were: The United States, Canada, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Island, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom.  
9
 Article five, and the Washington Treaty can be read here: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm  
10
 The Warsaw pact originally had eight member countries: The Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania, DDR and Czechoslovakia.  
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Vladimir Lenin’s concept of “peaceful coexistence” was possible. However, the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962 serves as a watershed in the history of the Cold War, and happened 
while he was the leader of the Soviet Union. In its aftermath a long truce followed, where the 
main goal was to avoid a devastating nuclear war (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 237).  
The so called “Khrushchev thaw” that ended in 1964 was followed by Leonid 
Brezhnev and his attempt to pursue détente. Détente was sought, as pointed out by Angela 
Stent (Legvold 2007: 413), for both political as well as economic reasons. In short, the 
complicated image of the situation in the Soviet Union and the relationship with the West 
when Brezhnev came to power can be described in the words of Stent (Legvold 2007: 411):  
As the USSR progressed from being a European great power at Stalin`s death to 
being a global superpower by Nikita Khrushchev’s ouster in 1664, Russia`s 
interactions with Europe became more complex and contradictory, involving 
elements of cooperation and confrontation. 
During the almost two decades in which Brezhnev was the leader of the USSR, there were in 
other words several waves of tension. Two important events created confrontational 
situations, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact came as a result of 
the wish of the Czechoslovakian elite to liberalize the communist system in the country. The 
decision by the Soviet Union to intervene in the name of socialism became known as the 
“Brezhnev-doctrine”. 
In 1985, three years after Brezhnev’s death, which was followed by a short period 
where Yuri Andropov and then Konstantin Chernenko were in power, Mikhail Gorbachev 
became the leader of the Soviet Union. In the words of Alfred J. Rieber (Legvold 2007: 235) 
what marked Gorbachev’s foreign policy was his attempt to “repudiate the so called Brezhnev 
Doctrine by invoking a new ideal of a “common European home”, a bid to end the cultural 
alienation of the USSR”. He was also, according to Stent (Legvold 2007: 394), the only leader 
who during the three centuries in which Russia/Soviet had been one of the players in the 
European state system, who actually had involved the country in all three dimensions of the 
Russia-Europe question. She claims (Legvold 2007: 394) that during Gorbachev’s rule, Soviet 
Russia was engaged in Europe “as an idea, a model and a geopolitical reality”. In the end, his 
attempt to liberalize the communist system by the famous reforms of glasnost and perestroika 
together with his rejection of the Brezhnev doctrine, which allowed the states in Eastern 
Europe to break loose from their communist chains, contributed to the collapse of the Soviet 
29 
 
Union. With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union shortly 
after, the era of Cold War was over. By the West, Gorbachev was awarded with the Nobel 
Peace Prize as he “brought the Cold War to a peaceful end” (nobelpeaceprize.org).  
The era of Cold War was characterized by waves of tension, by arms race and by 
the division of the world – the democratic and capitalist West against the communist East. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the West and Soviet was complex, due to how it was, 
as pointed out in Stent’s quote, characterized by cooperation as well as confrontations 
(Legvold 2007: 411). It was under these intricate circumstances that the Russia-NATO 
relationship was established. Despite the fact that the division of the world during the Cold 
War was extreme in many ways, the gap between Russia/Soviet and the West was not 
something new. In Iver B. Neumann and Vincent Pouliot’s article “Untimely Russia: 
Hysteresis in Russian-Western Relations over the Past Millennium” the development of a 
Russia different to its Western counter-pieces is discussed. Based on Pierre Bourdieu’s 
political sociology they wish to identify the patterns behind Russia’s “deep-rooted inclination 
for untimely diplomacy” (Neumann and Pouliot: 2011: 106). They use the concept of 
hysteresis
11
 to explain how clashes and mismatches in the realm of international relations 
occur. In the Russian case they claim that the hysteresis have taken two main forms during the 
last millennium, which have influenced Russian diplomacy. The first form of hysteresis is the 
way Russian diplomacy has been considered uncivilized, barbarian and deemed backwards by 
the West. The explanation for this clash between Western and Russian diplomacy is explained 
by the dispositions that have been carried over from the period in history when Russia’s 
contact with non-Europeans was more frequent than its contact with Europeans. The second 
form for hysteresis is Russia’s attempt to “punch above the country’s weight” in dealings at 
the international stage. This is explained as a result of the consistent desire to be recognized 
as an equal by its Western counterparts (Neumann and Pouliot 2011:112-113).  
In their study, Neumann and Pouliot, use Nikita Khrushchev as an example for 
describing the untimely diplomacy under which the Soviet Union suffered. They (Neumann 
and Pouliot 2011: 131) see his famous shoe banging episode at the United Nations General 
Assembly in October 1960 as an event which fifty years later “still echoes the perceived lack 
of sophistication and refinement in Soviet diplomatic practices”. This episode, and what can 
                                                 
11
 Neumann and Pouliot (2011: 109) borrow this term form Bourdieu and states that hysteresis is “a mismatch 
between the dispositions agents embody and the positions they occupy in a given social configuration. It is often 
at the root of symbolic struggles in social and political life, including those on the international stage.” 
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be said to be an example of continued political culture and practices, illustrates the distance 
felt between the Soviet and the West then during the Cold War.  
Following the early 1990s, and the years of transition from a communist state 
system to a market oriented economy - and at the best a quasi-democratic system - was 
Yeltsin’s attempt to bring post-Soviet Russia closer to the West. In the following I will take a 
closer look at Russia’s wish to learn from the Western model and then its steady development 
of moving away from it. I will also show how the old image of NATO as a foe and as an 
aggressor, whose aim has always been Russia, continued to play a part in Russian foreign and 
security politics. 
 
3.4.2 Yeltsin’s presidential periods 
Boris Yeltsin became the president of Russia after Gorbachev’s Union of socialistic states had 
evaporated, and its 15 republics had become 15 new countries. The confusion and identity 
search that Russia experienced after it had emerged as a new state as a result of the fall of the 
USSR, is described by Light (White, Sakwa and Hale: 2010: 225) as follows: “It was unclear 
that Russia had lost an empire, but there was general agreement within the country that Russia 
had lost its identity when the USSR disintegrated”. In 1993 the first Foreign Policy Concept 
(FPC) was adopted, and the need for a coherent set of principles which could juggle the 
aspirations of regaining great power status and the reality of its loss of power and influence, 
was immense. However, according to Light (White, Sakwa and Hale 2010: 229-230), neither 
the FPC nor the Military Doctrine
12
 that was adopted later the same year, actually resulted in 
a more coherent Russian foreign policy.  
In the initial years of post-Soviet Russia, the foreign policy, by the hands of 
president Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev, was influenced by Westernizsm. 
This meant that they believed in Russia’s ability to participate in the Euro-Atlantic 
community (Legvold 2007: 111). Together they represented those who thought that Russia 
did have a place in the West and that they could be a part of what they called a strategic 
community “from Vancouver to Vladivostok” (Legvold 2007: 109). This optimism also 
affected Russia’s relationship with NATO, and in 1991 Russia joined the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC).  
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It might be worth noting that just like post-Soviet Russia, NATO was also faced 
with the challenges of redefining its role and its aims as the Cold War had ended. The 
alliance’s main reason for formation and existence had ceased to exist. There was a shared 
understanding on both sides that it was necessary, in order to secure a peaceful future, that 
NATO and Russia had to come to an agreement on their relationship and their new roles, a 
form of reconciliation (Mankoff 2009: 164).  
In 1994 Russia became one of the members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) program. This was a program designed to institutionalize partnerships with NATO for 
non-members of the alliance. Of importance to the Russian leadership was that this form of 
cooperation was not a tool that could be used for political integration, but rather the PfP was 
seen as a program that would contribute to reduced tensions in the NATO-Russia relationship 
(Mankoff 2009: 165-166). However, there was an abrupt end to this process when NATO 
decided to include countries from Eastern and Central Europe into the alliance. This decision 
was received with disbelief from the Russian government, who thought Gorbachev had been 
promised otherwise by the alliance. In Russia there is a conviction that NATO made a 
“pledge” not to expand into the area of the previous Warsaw Pact members, while on the 
other side, NATO officials refuse that has ever happened (Kramer 2009: 39).
13
 Furthermore, 
this alleged promise given to Gorbachev that NATO would not enlarge in the post-Soviet 
space has indeed become an image “in Russian official and analytical discussion” of how 
NATO makes promises that it later breaks (Monaghan 2011: 4). NATO, on its side, claimed 
that enlargement and inclusion of new members was the best way to stabilize the situation in a 
Europe. This, however, brought back memories of the Cold War, and as pointed out by 
Mankoff (2009: 166) “to Moscow NATO remained the NATO of the Cold War and its 
expansion a sign that the West still sought to contain Russia”. 
 The process of NATO’s enlargement was also of importance to Yevgeni 
Primakov, appointed foreign minister in 1996. His stance on Russia’s relationship with the 
West was much more pragmatic than Kozyrev’s had been. He wanted the international system 
to inhabit the features of multi-polarity and represented a perspective influenced by 
Eurasianism, though in a mild sense. Primakov also wanted Russia to return as a great power, 
but understood that even though Russia was not like the West, it had advantages avoiding 
confrontation and keeping status quo. This is also why, according to Legvold (2007: 5), that 
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 To read more about the controversial  debate about the alleged “pledge” NATO made not to enlarge into the 
areas of previous Warsaw Pact members, see Mark Kramer’s article “The myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement 
Pledge to Russia” (2009). 
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when the invitation for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to enter NATO was made 
official in 1997, the Russian leadership could do nothing but accept the inclusion that 
followed in 1999. Furthermore, Russia even signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security in 1997, which formalized the Russia-NATO relationship at a new 
level and established the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).
14
 However, the PJC did not provide 
the tools needed to enhance communication and cooperation between the alliance and Russia 
(Åtland 2003:18). And according to Legvold (2007: 5) the Russians never took PJC seriously. 
As the crisis in the Balkans developed from bad to worse during the last years of the 1990s 
and NATO decided to intervene in Kosovo in 1999, Russia decided to break all contact with 
NATO through the PJC (Legvold  2007: 5). This break in relations led to a historical low 
point, up to this moment, in communication between NATO and Russia
15
 (Åtland 2003: 18). 
However, the fact that Russia had signed the Founding Act and joined the PJC in 
the first place, can be seen as Russia’s recognition of NATO of the 1990s as something 
different from NATO during the Cold War. The new NATO was no longer a direct threat to 
Russia, but with the alliance decision to admit more states and its decision to intervene in 
Kosovo, the old image of NATO kept reappearing, especially to Russia’s political and 
military elite (Mankoff 2009 :168).  
Russian foreign policy during the 1990s was characterized by economic instability 
and a Russia that suffered the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the 
first part of this decade, dependence on western money as well as expertise was great, but as 
stated by Neumann and Pouloit (2011: 132) from the mid 1990s “age-old Great Power 
dispositions resurfaced among policy makers in Moscow, prompting a misalignment with the 
lower position occupied by the country inside the NATO-dominated field of international 
security”. The differences between Russia and the West during Yeltsin’s two presidential 
terms can safely be said to have been far less than during the Cold War. However, there are 
still examples of untimely diplomacy, which may be said to highlight the continued gap that 
still existed. Legvold (2007:119-120) offers descriptions of Yeltsin’s appearance in 
international forums, such as one at the Budapest Summit in December 1994 on the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation. Here, Yeltsin chose to criticize NATO’s - then 
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 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation 
Paris, 27 May 1997 can be read here: http://www.nato-russia-
council.info/OffDocs_Detail.aspx?OffDocsID=1174 
15
 In his study Åtland uses the term transaction and transaction density in dealing with communication on 
different subjects such as politics and economy. See his research paper “Russlands Forhold til NATO og EU: På 
vei mot et sikkerhetsfellesskap?”(2003) for more information. 
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possible - enlargement by suggesting that such an action would threaten the stability of 
Europe and the democratic development in Russia. According to Legvold (2007:119) Yeltsin 
at this summit even made Bill Clinton startled with his harsh and menacing language talking 
about NATO’s enlargement as a “reprise of Cold War divisions”. This may be seen as an 
example that displays the differences in Russian and Western diplomacy that played out also 
within the Russia-NATO relationship.  
Towards the end of Yeltsin’s second term, Prime Minister Valdimir Putin took 
over the post as president of the Russian Federation, and was then elected for the two next 
presidential terms. 
 
3.4.3 Putin’s first presidential period 
When Putin came to power, Russia had yet to recover from the transition of the 1990s. 
Therefore, his foreign policy during the first years as president, reflected the need for 
domestic stability and economic growth. As pointed out by MacFarlane (Braun 2008: 44), one 
of the main elements in the foreign policy discourse in Russia at this time was that of 
partnership. This meant cooperation with both the US and Europe in the West, and China in 
the East. Some observers would even describe the return to alignment with the West during 
the beginning of Putin’s presidency as a sign that Russia now had turned its back completely 
to the elements of its identity rooted in its history with Asia. Tsygakov (2010: 19) states that 
great power status remained important to Putin during his first years, but also describes the 
process that developed as one where it turned away from “the policy of balancing against the 
West”. According to him (Tsygakov 2010: 19), Putin “explicitly sided with Europe and the 
United States and insisted that Russia was a country of European and Western, rather than, 
Asian identity”.  
Only few months after he was elected president in March 2000, a new Foreign 
Policy concept was adopted, replacing the one from 1993.
16
 According to Light (White, 
Sakwa and Hale 2010: 231) the new FPC focused on predictability and consistency in Russian 
foreign policy, as well as it highlighted the importance of pragmatism, which it stated ought 
to serve as a mutual advantage in the international system.  
With respect to Russia’s relationship with NATO, the FPC of 2000 stated that 
Russia still held a negative position on the subject of the eastward enlargement of the alliance 
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which took place in 1999. The FPC had, according to Legvold (2007: 317), an overall 
negative tone against NATO and declared that there was a conflict between Russia’s security 
interests and the interests of the alliance. Further, the National Security Concept,
17
 a 
document that was adopted the same year as the new FPC, also referred to the enlargement of 
NATO and deemed it one of Russia’s “major threats” in terms of national security (Legvold 
2007:310). However, as Legvold (2007: 310) further points out, there were no suggestions or 
specifications as to any measures that should have been applied to stop NATO and its 
growing sphere of influence. Hence, he believes, that this reflects how the Russian 
government had come to terms with the development that resulted in a new wave of 
enlargement in 2004, and that the Russian leadership understood that it was not in position to 
prevent it. 
The terrorist attack on the US September 11
th
 in 2001, has in hindsight been 
described as a watershed in Russia’s relationship with the West. The event put international 
terrorism on the agenda, and it opened up for new forms of cooperation. Putin famously 
declared that Russia would fight together with the West in the “war against terror” (Åtland 
2003: 14). This cooperation also affected Russia’s relationship with NATO. The will to fight 
terror, and stand alongside the West while doing it, resulted in tighter bonds between NATO 
and Russia, and in May 2002 the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established (Åtland 
2003: 15). The NRC was to formalize the cooperation NATO had with Russia through a 
better institutionalized form than that of the PJC. The goal was to create a forum where 
Russia could have a say in the process of negotiation, as it had complained over the so-called 
“16+1 format” of the PJC. This format meant that, in practice, Russia hardly had any 
influence in the decision making. Hence, the NRC was seen as an opportunity to enhance its 
position when it came to making decisions on security policy with NATO (Mankoff 2009: 
169).  
Like Tsygakov, Shevstova (2010: 50) recognizes that during the two first years as 
president of the Russian Federation, Putin reached the peak in his pro-Western orientation. 
However, she is – as many with her – convinced that the role Russia attained as a partner in 
fighting terror during these years, in part was a result of its wish to legitimize the much 
criticized war it lead in Chechnya – not a sign of Russia’s leaders having chosen a European 
identity for the country. Further, Shevtsova believes that the pro-Western stance that Russia 
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led in the early years of 2000, was limited to a partnership that did not take into account the 
“civilizational dimension”. By this she means that the cooperation and partnership Russia 
sought with the West “contained a rejection of the values of Western civilization” and she 
emphasizes the internal development of Russia during these years to demonstrate this point 
(Shevstova 2010: 48). To her, the process of centralization of power by eliminating all 
potential challengers on the political stage and the establishment of Putin`s “power vertical”, 
confirm this belief. Åtland (2003:15) also points at the fact that there seemed to be no interest 
from either side in developing a common interpretation of what international terror really 
meant, possibly due to fear of jeopardizing the historical new partnership. 
The atmosphere in the relationship between Russia and the West, and notably 
between Russia and NATO, during Putin’s first term as president caused optimism and belief 
in that the time of confrontation had ended. However, the Russian elite – with Putin at the 
front – had not forgotten the image of Russia as a great power, but they had understood the 
importance of recovering, ensuring stabilization and economic growth before pursuing this 
vision further. Mankoff describes the strategic choices during this period in these words 
(2009:24): 
In bandwagoning with the United States after September 11, 2001, and seeking to 
minimize quarrels with the West thereafter, Putin made a strategic calculation that 
international cooperation – along with restoring the domestic base of Russian 
strength – was the most effective means of recapturing Russia’s lost global 
influence.  
During Putin’s first term there was a growing sense of optimism in the West. And the 
prospects of a Russia that could be a liberal democracy, which the West could cooperate with 
and trust as it was one of their own, still seemed within reach. However, towards the end of 
Putin’s first term and during the beginning of his second, the picture slowly started to change. 
And as discussed above, while some believed Russia was on its way to fully engage in a 
European identity, some have declared it only a strategic choice, where Russia acted 
according to Western expectations in order to attain domestic stabilization and growth. 
 
3.4.4 Putin’s second presidential period 
The contours of a Russia moving in a different direction than many in the West had hoped 
and believed, became more visible in Putin’s second term. Several events during the year 
2006, which by observers have been pointed out as the year when Russia`s new self-
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confidence started showing for real, further confirmed Russia’s growing assertiveness. This 
development is closely linked with the economic upturn experienced in Russia due to the 
world market’s high prices of oil and gas at the time. As pointed out by Mankoff (2010: 32), 
the “economic transformation” turned the tables around, as it enabled Russia to pay off its 
debt both to the IMF and other Western creditors, at the same time as Russia had become an 
energy power which the European countries now were reliant on.  This gave reason to feel 
that the West’s nose had nothing to do in Russia’s internal affairs anymore (Legvold 2007: 
125). The new self-confidence became world known at the Munich Security Conference in 
February 2007. Here, Putin held his famous speech where he, according to Trenin (2009: 70) 
“made clear that Russia no longer accepted the rules of the game set up after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, when Russia was weak”. He also made his Western counterparts jump 
when he attacked NATO with US at the front, and made “provocative allusions to the Third 
Reich” (Braun 2008: 56). This speech may also be seen as an example of untimely diplomacy 
linked to Neumann and Pouloit’s notion of the perceived gap that seems not to ever really 
have closed between Russia and the West. Moreover, the aspirations for being treated like an 
equal resulted in fear, not respect from its counter-pieces.  
Furthermore, during Putin’s second term the new objectives were clear: the 
Russian leadership wanted equality with both the US and the EU at the same time as it wanted 
“soft dominance” in its “near abroad” (Trenin 2009: 64). After having been in no position to 
fight for influence in the areas of the previous Soviet Union due to domestic challenges up 
until this point, the strong growth in Russia’s economy and the political stable situation made 
it claim its interests with more force than previously. As pointed out by Lawrence T. Caldwell 
(Legvold 2007: 313), the “loss of leverage” in these areas had been a sensitive matter for a 
long time. And in 2004, the second round of NATO enlargement led to massive protests. As 
the first time around, the Russian government had not been able to prevent the development 
of round two from taking pace. The enlargement of NATO eastward in 2004 deserves to be 
treated with special attention, as the event is an important part of the debate about NATO in 
the Russian newspapers from 2004. This round of new memberships included the three Baltic 
states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were all previous Soviet republics with borders 
to Russia. According to Mankoff (2009:170), their inclusion in the alliance put off a 
“firestorm” within the political elite in Russia. However, it may worth noting that the 
resistance against the prospect of having NATO members on its borders was not a 
geographically rooted problem. One example of this is how Norway, which also borders with 
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Russia, has been a member of NATO since the alliance was established. The Baltic countries 
were, however, previous republics of the Soviet Union, which now clearly marked their 
change in priority and loyalty. In addition, there was a disagreement due to the fact that these 
new members of NATO had not ratified the new CFE Treaty (Mankoff: 170-171).
18
 
The enlargement of NATO, and its steady move towards Russia’s borders have 
been looked upon as an event that caused tension in Russia’s relationship with NATO. 
However, some see the need to counterbalance this view. According to Shevtsova (2010: 
140), in Russia the “most popular international tale told” is the story of NATO’s enlargement 
(together with the Kosovo crisis) as the reason behind the strained relationship with the West. 
The tale, she states, is used by the Russian elite in order to play on the European guilt as well 
as it effectively supports “the militaristic syndrome in Russian society” (2010:140). No matter 
what perspective is chosen, though, the fact that relations between Russia and the West in 
general, and Russia and NATO in particular, soured during Putin’s second term, seems to be 
clear.  
After the 2004 enlargement, the tensions between Russia and NATO continued to 
worsen, especially in terms of influence in the areas of the previous USSR. Caldwell (Legvold 
2007: 313) points at a number of events that occurred during 2006, where Russia tried to 
strengthen its position in its near abroad, such as the gas dispute with Ukraine and a boycott 
of Georgian and Moldavian wine, which led to an increased level of tension between Russia 
and the West. The episode with Ukraine, where Russia turned off its gas deliveries to the 
country, is said to be rooted in the events of the Orange revolution when the pro-Western 
Viktor Yushchenko was elected president in 2004. He had won the election on the basis of his 
Western-friendly policy where independence from Russia played a significant part. He had 
also opened up for the process of seeking membership in European and Western institutions – 
including NATO.  The gas dispute was officially an attempt to make Ukraine pay market 
price for its gas, but it also marked a turn in Russian foreign policy as it had decided to 
remind Ukraine of its dependence on Russia (Mankoff 2009: 24-25). The importance of 
Ukraine and Georgia to Russia has become clear as both countries have shown will to move 
closer to the West and further away from Russia’s influence. A development they signaled to 
the world with the color revolutions. The development made the Russian government take 
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 The CFE Treaty (Treaty on Conventional armed Forces in Europe) was signed in 1990 and its goal was to 
control the presence of military units that were placed within the territories of the countries who signed the 
agreement (Mankoff 2009: 170). In 1999 the treaty was revised at the Istanbul summit. However, as NATO 
members at the time believed that Russia had not followed its promise regarding troops in Georgia and Moldova 
they had not ratified the revised CFE treaty (NATO.int: A). 
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action in order to show that it was a process it did not agree with, and there was no way it 
would sponsor the change by supplying Ukraine with gas well beneath market price (Mankoff 
2009: 24).  
 In addition, within the same year, several events marked the distance between 
Russia and the West. In 2006, the journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the dissident and former 
KBG agent, Aleksandr Litvinenko were killed, and while the Russian government claimed it 
had nothing to do with any of these murders, it nonetheless created an atmosphere that made 
the West uneasy (Mankoff 2009: 25). 
Russia, under the lead of Putin showed that dealing with the West did not 
necessarily mean adjusting to their values, goals and use it as a model to shape its institutions 
or society. Concerning the different schools of thought, Legvold (2007: 110) is of the opinion 
that there are reasons to claim that Putin may belong to the spectre of moderate Eurasianists - 
“at least when he rises some mornings”. However, he (Legvold 2007: 111) further points out, 
that during Putin’s time as a president there were two elements to his foreign policy that does 
not fit this characterization. The first being the way he has emphasized Russia’s natural 
attachment to Europe, and second that he does not seem to share the rejection of globalization 
of the Eurasianists. At the same time, it can be worth mentioning how the changes and the 
new tone, which the Russian government took on in the two periods of Putin’s presidency, did 
not happen as a mere result of new goals that were established during this period. They took 
place as a result of the changes in its circumstances that allowed Russia to reach for its goals 
(Mankoff 2009: 7-8). 
 
3.4.5 Medvedev’s first presidential period 
During president Medvedev’s close to three years in office from 2008 until the end of 2010, 
the war with Georgia in the summer of 2008 has been the event that has influenced the 
Russia-NATO relationship the greatest. Using the term “conflict” between Russia and NATO 
after this episode would seem exaggerated, however, the level of tension was high and formal 
cooperation through the NRC was suspended as a result of it (NATO.int: B). In addition to 
this break in relations, however, there were attempts to resume contact with NATO and to 
restore the partnership under Medvedev’s rule. President Medvedev was also present at 
NATO’s Lisbon summit in November 2010, a symbolic performance for the continuation of 
building Russia-NATO relations.  
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The priorities of Russia’s foreign policy in these last years are stated in the new 
and updated version of Putin’s Foreign Policy Concept, from 2008.19 According to Mankoff 
(2009: 13), the revised FPC shares about 80 percent of the text with its previous version. 
However, some of the changes that were made are worth mentioning. One of the changes that 
have been seen as important is the removal of the term “great power” from the Concept. 
Russia is instead referred to as “one of the leading centers of the contemporary world” 
(Mankoff 2009: 13). In addition, the 2008 FPC is supposedly also less concerned with the 
importance of its close neighbors. However, the invasion of Georgia was to many a sign that 
this was indeed still of great significance.  
Further, shortly after the conflict with Georgia had ended, Medvedev illustrated 
Russia’s priorities within the sphere of its foreign policy, as he declared five guiding 
principles that later have been given the term the “Medvedev Doctrine”. These principles 
were not entirely new, but they stated Russian goals more explicitly than what they perhaps 
had been done previously, causing skepticism in the West (Mankoff 2009: 31-32). The five 
principles evolved around, firstly, Russia’s acknowledgment of the “supremacy of the basic 
principles of international law”. Secondly, the Doctrine declared a wish to see the world as 
multi-polar, due to how a world “dominated by one power” is unstable (the “one power” 
reflects the resistance to US’s role in a contemporary world). Thirdly, it states that Russia 
does not seek “confrontation with any country”. Fourthly, and a contested principle in the 
West, deals with Russian citizens and the importance of aiding them with protection 
“wherever they are located”. Also the fifth principle caused a negative reaction from Western 
commentators, as it sounded obsolete to claim that Russia had regions “in which it maintains 
privileged interests” (Mankoff 2009: 31). However, although the principles might have 
caused skepticism, at least Moscow was stating its objectives out loud. 
Furthermore, by looking at the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, there are 
a few aspects that can be claimed important in understanding the development of the 
relationship between Russia and NATO. The development that led to the final decision to go 
to war had been ongoing for a while, and was sparked by a whole range of factors, including 
Russia’s stance on its role as a protector of Russian citizens of which there are many in the 
disputed areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Further, the Rose revolution of 2003 and then-
elected president Mikheil Saakashvili’s announcement of Georgia’s wish to apply for NATO 
                                                 
19




membership, were part of this development of worsening relations between Russia and 
Georgia (White, Sakwa and Hale 2010:237). The war marked a shift in Russian foreign policy 
as it chose to use military force in order to secure its interests. Further, seen in a larger foreign 
policy context, the decision to go to war with Georgia can be described in the words of 
Shevtsova (2010: 81) as “mainly a pretext for the Kremlin to secure a more assertive Russian 
role in the world, reformulate its relations with the West, and force the United States to agree 
to the new world order, at least in the former Soviet space”. In addition, Mankoff (2009: 7) 
points at how the path that Putin and Medvedev chose for Russia up to the invasion of 
Georgia was not new, or in itself more threatening, but that Russia “has merely recovered 
enough to act in a way that even most Yeltsinites desired” (Mankoff 2009:7).  
The Russia-NATO relationship did, as already pointed out, suffer from Russia’s 
invasion of Georgia. In September 2008, the NATO members decided to suspend the 
communication in some areas with Russia, in terms of formal meetings and cooperation, 
through the NRC “while it considered the implications of Russia`s actions for the NATO-
Russia relationship” (NATO.int: C). It took approximately a year before the NATO countries 
decided to resume formal contact with Russia through the NRC, and the first formal meeting 
at ministerial level after the contact had been suspended took place in December 2009 
(NRC.info). 
Towards the end of 2010, the Russia-NATO relationship seemed to undergo a 
new cooperative wave, and the break in 2008-2009 was followed by a return to a softer 
approach from Russia’s side. At the third summit of the NRC, at Lisbon in November 2010, 
the member countries together with Russia stated a common wish for a new improved 
strategic partnership and completed the Joint Review of Twenty First Century Common 
Security Challenges.
20
 According to Monaghan (2011: 2), the review had a dual purpose, as it 
attempted both to change perceptions into a shared view of NATO and Russia’s common 
threats and challenges, and identified five different cooperation projects.
21
  
Although the summit in Lisbon created a new sense of optimism in the Russia-
NATO relationship, there are still differences that surface and strain the cooperation. One 
important difference is how NATO and Russia has dissimilar perspectives on what lies in the 
term partnership, and there is also lack of common understanding of the concept 
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 To read about the summit: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68876.htm, and The joint statement can 
be read here: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_68871.htm  
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“indivisibility of security” (Monaghan 2011: 3). This means that the Russian perception of 
what cooperation within the field of security holds, may not always correspond to what 
NATO believes fall within the partnership. From the NATO point of view, national, 
European, Eurasian and global security is linked to each other and states should be free to 
choose its alliance. This view also holds that no state has “a sphere of privileged interests” 
and that “security within states is as much a part of security between states” (Monaghan 2011: 
3). However, in Russian ears this sounds off beat, and sees this as fragmentation of security. It 
expects legally binding commitments, because without it “Moscow sees Euro-Atlantic 
security as rendered “divisible”” (Monaghan 2011: 3). 
Further, despite the wave of cooperation and a return to a softer approach to the 
West, after the growing assertiveness during the end of Putin’s second presidency, there are 
still reasons to claim that there are still challenges in the Russia-NATO relationship. 
Monaghan (2011:4) points at two factors that cause problems in the NATO-Russia relations. 
The first being that of Russian scepticism to NATO with respect to what it considers being a 
gap in what the alliance says it will do and what it actually does. This, Monaghan claims 
(2011: 4), can be seen as mistrust rooted back all the way to the alleged promise Russians 
believe was given to Gorbachev considering enlargement and eastward movement of the 
alliance. The second factor that clouds the relationship, is the lack of influence Russia feels it 
has on NATO’s decisions. The NRC was, as mentioned above, meant to create a forum 
different from the “16+1” format of the PJC. However, according to Monaghan (2011: 4) seen 
with Russian eyes, the NRC still has a “+1” format, which results in Russian suggestions 
being rejected or even ignored. 
During Medvedev’s first presidency there has been a distinct wave of tension 
from a definite peak during the war with Georgia to a softer approach following the financial 
crisis which hit the country hard during the fall of 2008. It now claims it has recovered well 
from the crisis, and it still remains to see whether this will cause a new wave of assertive 
foreign policy. It might be worth noting that, when assessing the first three years of 
Medvedev’s first presidency, there doesn’t seem to be many examples where he has caused 
Western colleagues to jump due to untimely diplomacy. This might be one of the reasons why 
Medvedev has been seen as more “Western-friendly” and suited to deal with matters of 





3.5 Public opinion about NATO 
As has been illustrated by looking at the history of the Russia-NATO relationship, there have 
been several waves of increasing and decreasing level of tensions. And since the time of the 
Cold War, Russia’s relationship with the West consisted of both elements of cooperation as 
well as of confrontation. This description also reflects Russia’s relationship with NATO. 
After having looked at how Russia-NATO relations have developed since the time of the Cold 
War and until 2010, it might also be worth assessing the public opinion in Russia about 
NATO before moving on to the analysis of the debate in the Russian newspapers. In a study 
done by the Levada Centre,
22
 the development of attitudes towards NATO from 1999 to 2009 
is assessed (russiavotes.org). In the survey one question asked “what meets Russia’s interests 
best” and in terms of “admission to NATO”, 10 percent thought this favourable to Russia in 
1999, in contrast to 3 percent in 2009. The trend was a steady decline in this approach each 
year. Further, “cooperation with NATO” was in 1999 and 2009 seen as positive for Russia by 
22 and 23 percent respectively. But what is interesting is the increase in 2003, when as many 
as 43 percent believed that cooperation with NATO would be a good alternative for Russia. 
This can be seen as a result of Putin’s policy in the beginning of his first presidential period, 
where he emphasized good relations with NATO through the battle against terrorism and as 
means of strengthening Russia’s domestic situation.  
Furthermore, another interesting point can be made in terms of the role NATO 
plays in the foreign policy discourse in Russia. A survey done by the Levada Centre in 2011 
shows that in January this year, 23 percent of those asked, perceived NATO as an adversary 
to Russia (atlantic-community.org). In contrast, 42 percent answered that Chechen rebels 
posed a danger to Russia. Thus, the image of Russia`s natural adversary have changed, and as 
pointed out by Julie Wilhelmsen (2011) the image of Russia’s “other” has been altered as the 
perceived threat to Russia concerns Chechnya, rather than the West. This may be said to 
contribute to placing the analysis of the debate about NATO in Russia in a larger context. 
Because even though the perspectives on NATO are central aspects of Russia’s foreign 
policy, it is important to note that there are other issues that concerns both the Russian 
leadership and the public more.  
 
 
                                                 
22
 As the English version of Levada’s site (http://old.levada.ru/eng/index.html) is currently under construction 
(2011.10.22) the surveys referred to are available at RussiaVotes: http://www.russiavotes.org/. 
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3.6 Before the analysis 
From looking both at some important aspects of Russia’s identity in terms of its foreign 
policy and the history of the Russia-NATO relationship, some concluding remarks may be 
done in relations to the analysis of the NATO discourse in the Russian newspapers, which 
follows in the next chapter. The relationship between Russia and NATO has at times 
flourished and other at other times stagnated. During the Cold War the Soviet Union and 
NATO were each other’s main adversaries. Following the demise of the USSR, the Russian 
Federation has struggled to find its place on the international arena. For many Russians the 
transformation of the 1990s not only led to financial difficulties and a new way of life, it also 
meant that their identity as citizens of the Soviet Union - a great power and one of the two 
poles in a bipolar world - abruptly lost its meaning. Being Russian was synonymous with 
being a Soviet citizen, and Russia itself was for many the same as the Soviet Union. Thus, in 
the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union the loss of the Soviet identity led to what has 
been described above as an “identity crises” with respect to the development of the foreign 
policy in Russia. This chapter has further illustrated how great power aspirations, Russia’s 
relationship with the West and its “near abroad” were continuing elements important in the 
process of creating a post-Soviet Russian identity. This has had implications for its 
relationship with NATO, especially considering NATO’s enlargements and the process of 
making partnerships with previous members of the Soviet Union, in areas where Russia 
considers its role as unique.  
From the early 1990s until the end of the first decade of this millennium, the 
Russia-NATO relationship has been through different phases. With Yeltsin, the post-Soviet 
Russia, which suffered from economic distress due to the transformation, tied closer bonds 
with the West and established a partnership with NATO. During Putin’s first term, September 
11
th
 and the war against terror marked a new area for the relationship. While some observers 
thought Russia finally had decided to turn completely towards the West, other saw it as means 
to create domestic stability and economic growth. Putin’s second presidential term was 
characterized by events that one after the other made the relationship with the West and 
NATO increasingly strained. However, it was the events of the summer of 2008 that marked a 
definite highpoint in confrontational tensions, as Russia went to war with Georgia. The 
episode happened only months into Medvedev’s first presidency and in the very beginning of 
the establishment of the “power-tandem” consisting of Medvedev as president and Putin as 
Russia’s most prominent prime minister so far. Russia-NATO relations were suspended at 
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formal level through the NRC as a result of the war, and the event marked a peak in tensions 
in the relationship. Following this break, however, the partnership between and NATO and 
Russia has been reestablished, beginning slowly in 2009 and continuing into 2010. At the 
Lisbon summit in November 2010 the relationship reached a new phase, and in their Joint 
Statement they pointed out how they now “have embarked on a new stage of cooperation 
towards a true strategic partnership” (NATO.int: D).  
Russian foreign policy, in terms of NATO relations, can be said to have been 
influenced both by important events in the relationship, but also by the driving forces in 
Russian foreign policy. Therefore, the events linked to NATO’s enlargement and increased 
influence in areas of Russia’s “near abroad” has played an important role in the NATO 

























Chapter Four: The NATO debate 
 
Part 1: Main concerns  
2004-2010 
  
4.0 Overview of the main topics 
Between 2004 and 2010, hundreds of articles about NATO were written in Rossiskaya 
Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta. Out of these, I have read 206 articles for 
this thesis. Before studying the NATO debate more in depth, in the following the thesis will 
offer a short the overview of the debate in terms of the differences between the papers, the 
number of articles studied versus the number of articles available, and the main topics and 
concerns about NATO in the newspapers during this period. From this, a description of the 
overall development of the debate may be given. First, the profile of each paper will be 
discussed by looking at the way they present themselves to their readers versus the image I 
was left with as a result of the analysis. Then, an overview of each paper from 2004 until 
2010 is offered, by looking at what has characterized the debate in each of them during these 
years. 
 
4.1 The newspapers’ profiles 
According to Rossiskaya Gazeta (rg.ru) the paper had its first publication in November 1990 
and was established by “the new Russian government”. It classifies itself as an official 
newspaper, meaning that: “the publications here are in effect official documents” (rg.ru). 
Thus, there is no doubt that the newspaper presents the official line, also in the matters of 
foreign policy and the relationship with NATO. After having read 58 relevant articles from 
this paper, the image I was left with to a large degree confirms its profile as a newspaper that 
is directly linked to the Russian government. The way it presented the official view in terms 
of its relationship with NATO, was on most matters by the use of quotes from Russian 
officials, or just by referring to their statements. This resulted in an image of Russia’s 
relationship with NATO that to a large extent followed the official line from 2004 until the 
end of 2010. It did not offer many surprises. There was a lack of analysis and comments on 
official statements, and the only personal notes given, could be found in the many comments 
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and articles written by Sergey Karaganov. Karaganov is the publisher of Russia in Global 
Affairs and is described by Lilia Shevtsova (2010: 115) as one of the Russian experts which 
belong to the “moderate, balanced or even Westernizing voices in Russia”. However, 
according to her (Shevtsova 2010: 136), he is also attempting to “reconcile the irreconcilable” 
as he is striving to follow the official stand of Moscow while he at the same time is “warning 
against hewing to that line too closely”. One example of Karaganov’s contribution to debate 
in the paper, was how he in one article criticized the US for using the mechanisms of NATO 
in order to make Russia a scarecrow to keep Europe disciplined (rg.ru 2006.12.20). Also, the 
statements of Russia’s permanent representative to NATO since 2008, Dmitry Rogozin, offers 
a more personal tone in the paper’s articles between 2008 and 2010, for example through 
numerous of interviews.  
Nezavisimaya Gazeta sees itself as “one of the major periodical papers in modern 
Russia” and according to its own profile, it covers “issues of social, political and cultural life, 
both in Russia and abroad” (ng.ru). To a large extent the articles read for this analysis was 
found in the politics section of the paper (“NG-Politics”). This is described as a section which 
discusses “the most urgent” problems in modern politics, and has as a goal not just to publish 
“analytical materials written by prominent politicians and political scientist”, but to offer a 
sharp look at the official line by for example “monitoring of the most controversial political 
events” (ng.ru). After having read 87 relevant articles from this paper, it is clear that it offered 
a diverse image of NATO and the alliance’s role in relations to Russia. Not all articles offered 
a thorough analysis of Russia’s relationship with the alliance, but NG did comment on official 
statements to a larger degree than Rossiskaya Gazeta. One of the reasons why the paper can 
be said to represent more varied perspectives on NATO, was the frequently published articles 
by both Russian as well as foreign experts. These articles have been included in the analysis 
because the paper has made the choice to print them. The experts use these articles as a tool to 
get their opinions heard, and the opinions uttered are both negative and positive towards 
NATO, as well as to how Moscow deals with the alliance. These varying images of the 
alliance and Russia’s relationship with it, are representative of the image I have of the paper; 
one that lets a large range of perspectives be heard. 
Novaya Gazeta does not, as the other two have “about the paper” information on 
its website. Instead, it offers a small story of how it came about: a group of journalists 
dreaming about making a new Russian newspaper (novayagazeta.ru). This different way to 
present itself, may be said to be in line with the image of the paper as one that offers new 
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perspectives both on NATO and on Russia. After having read 61 relevant articles from this 
paper, it can be claimed that it provided its readers with more analysis of the Russia-NATO 
relationship in general, but also in terms of the political situation in Russia particular, than the 
two other papers. Articles in Novaya used the debate about NATO in order to criticize a 
development in Russia that it opposed.  
 
4.1.1 Main concerns from 2004 until 2010 
In general, it can be said that the debate about NATO from 2004 until 2010 reflected the main 
events in the Russia-NATO relationship, which have been described in the background 
chapter. Rossiskaya Gazeta often had articles that referred to certain meetings, events or 
happenings, whilst Nezavisimaya Gazeta did the same but added articles where the 
relationship between Russia and NATO was discussed or the role and the future of NATO 
was commented. The latter also goes for Novaya Gazeta, which used the events to ask critical 
questions, often related to Russia’s path forward. As described in the introduction, the choice 
of articles studied for the analysis was made on the basis of their perceived relevance for the 
debate after having acquired background information on the period, as well as on the basis of 
what was seen as the main topics out of all the articles available in each paper every year. 
Looking at the articles written in 2004, one event overshadowed all other, namely 
NATO’s second round of enlargement after the end of the Cold War, which included the 
previous republics of the Soviet Union, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. However, this is not 
the only topic treated in the papers. In 2004, RG, under its NATO-tag has 38 articles 
concerning NATO, of which 10 was read for the analysis. These, in addition to the alliance`s 
enlargement, also covered the role played by NATO in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
impression of the official stand on NATO from RG this year is that following the 2004-
enlargement there were indeed signs of dispute, which caused tension in the relationship. 
However, there was also focus on cooperation and on the diplomatic skills of Putin in 
relations to the alliance.  
NG has 64 articles under its NATO-tag in 2004, of which 14 were read for this 
study. In addition to the enlargement, NATO’s relationship with both Ukraine and Georgia 
was treated, as well as the challenges with the CFE treaty. As mentioned earlier, when it 
comes to Novaya, this paper’s online site does not have the same possibilities for article 
search as the others, and thus the exact number of articles for each year is not that easily 
found. However the trend has been a lower number of articles than in the two other papers, 
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but it often treated the same topics as the two. For 2004 the number of articles read was 7, 
several of them related to the enlargement.  
From reading 7 of the 10 articles available under the NATO-tag in RG in 2005, 
the relationship between Russia and NATO appeared to be one of good relations. Russia and 
NATO cooperation on different projects was highlighted, but the situation with both Ukraine 
and Kirgizstan as partners to NATO was treated with skepticism. The importance of the area 
of previous Soviet republics can also be seen from the 49 articles written in NG under its 
NATO-tag, and from the 15 articles read for the analysis. As the abovementioned papers, 
Novaya was also concerned with matters such as Georgia and Ukraine and their wish to turn 
westwards. However, in contrast to the other papers, Novaya seemed preoccupied with 
Belarus as only alternative Russia would have left if its neighbors continued to turn its back to 
it. 
The importance of the developments in Georgia and Ukraine following the color 
revolutions was, as described in the background chapter, significant to the Russian 
government. And this was also reflected in the papers’ coverage of NATO. In RG in 2006, 
many of the 22 articles under the general NATO-tag are also to be found under the “NATO 
and enlargement”-tag. But from looking at articles from the overall NATO-tag this year, and 
analyzing 6 of them, it was clear that there were also other topics of interest. Such as the 
Russian leadership’s wish to cooperate with NATO through CSTO, problems due to 
disagreement over the CFE treaty as well as concern over NATO patrolling in the Baltic 
airspace.  
Further, in NG the same year, the countries of the CIS in relation to NATO was of 
continued importance, and two countries, Georgia and Ukraine, were treated with a keen 
interest. Out of the 84 articles available at the paper’s link to articles on NATO, 14 were read 
for this analysis. As described in the background chapter, a process of cooling in relations 
between NATO and Russia was taking place at this time. The paper seems to have tried to 
counterbalance the negativity and let a number of foreign experts publish their articles, which 
focused upon need to continue cooperation between Russia and the alliance.  
From Novaya, 8 articles were read in 2006. These mainly treated the same topics 
as the other two, especially the situation of closer integration between NATO and Georgia 
and Ukraine. The development of other previous republics of the Soviet Union in Central 
Asia looking towards the West and NATO, were also important topics.  
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In 2007, the level of tension between Russia and the West increased with the US 
plans for an antimissile system (ABM) in the Czech Republic and in Poland, and with the 
decision by Russia to withdraw from the CFE treaty. This is reflected in RG’s articles, and the 
new tag “Building of ABM in Europe” was observed for the first time under the umbrella of 
the NATO-tag. Reading the 8 of the 18 articles from RG this year gave an impression of a 
steady rising level of tension. This could also be observed in NG’s 73 articles from 2007, 
including from the 12 read for this analysis. In addition, a number of articles were 
preoccupied with Ukraine, Georgia, and other post-Soviet republics and their relationship 
with NATO. Further, Afghanistan and the situation in Kosovo was treated as a topics within 
the NATO debate.  
From the 8 articles read from Novaya in 2007, the impression was that the topics 
were related to the abovementioned, as a result of the development towards a more assertive 
Russian foreign policy at this time. Further, one article from 2007 illustrated the paper’s 
concerns in the Russia-NATO relationship by looking at several events which caused strains 
to the relationship, such as the killing of Aleksander Litvinenko, the problems with the CFE 
treaty, American bases in Europe and the dispute over the independence of Kosovo 
(novayagazeta.ru 2007.07.30).  
As have been illustrated in the previous chapter, from the middle of Putin’s 
second presidency, Russia showed muscles internationally as a result of a boost in the 
country’s economy due to high prices on oil and gas. This process continued into Medvedev’s 
first period, with the war in Georgia. In 2008, the war in itself was not the main topic in 
relations to NATO, although it was of course treated in all of the three newspapers. In the 
case of RG, for the whole year, 59 articles were to be found under the NATO-tag. From 
looking at these articles, including the 10 read for the analysis, the NATO debate in RG to a 
large extent was preoccupied with the results of the Bucharest summit in April that year, 
which was when the decision on possible memberships of Ukraine and Georgia was taken. 
However, the war with Georgia was also treated, although it seems as though the situation at 
the end of the year, when NATO and Russia attempted to resume some contact again, was of 
more importance than the war itself. 
2008 was also the year when NG reached a peak in the number of articles written 
about NATO. The number was 232, of which 14 were read for the analysis, and they treated a 
whole range of subjects. However, a pattern can be traced, and the main area of interest this 
year was without doubt Georgia. Articles were also concerned with NATO’s mission in 
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Afghanistan, and on the alliance presence in the previous Soviet republics as a result of it, 
such as in Kirgizstan. Further, there was still an interest around the CFE treaty and the ABM 
system. However, at the end of the year, hope of reconnecting with NATO again can also be 
seen. In Novaya, there were also more articles on NATO this year than the previous, and 13 
were read for this study. Several of the articles were concerned with Ukraine and Georgia, and 
how the Russian government attempted to hinder their integration with the West through 
NATO.  
In 2009 and 2010 there was a movement towards resuming contact and looking 
forward in the Russia-NATO relationship. This is reflected in the newspapers’ contribution on 
NATO in this period. During the year 2009, the number of articles available under the 
NATO-tag at RG was 99, but to a larger extent than before, many of these were just small 
updates written only for the internet edition or for local publications. It seems that after the 
end of 2008, NATO was not a subject treated with as much of an interest as it was earlier. 
Furthermore, in 2010, the RG had 46 articles under the NATO-tag and out of these 14 were 
written in November, the month of the Lisbon summit, illustrating its perceived importance. 
The 6 articles read for the analysis dealt with the summit and the possibilities for cooperation 
in the future.  
Further, NG still had a large number of articles in 2009 and 2010, 169 and 194 
respectively. In 2009 the relationship between NATO and Georgia and Ukraine was still 
given attention. So were the main topics already highlighted through the last years, but of 
special interest was NATO’s new secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The softening 
in relations can also be seen in from the 169 articles available and the 10 articles analyzed. In 
2010, NG followed the trend in RG with articles about softening in relations and focus on the 
Lisbon summit in November that year. The difference between RG and NG during these years 
was that the last of the two treated these subjects from different perspectives and did not state 
facts only, it discussed the challenges of a continued mutual mistrust in the relationship. 
Reading 8 articles from 2009 and 8 from 2010 in Novaya, it can be said that the 
articles were concerned with the same as those in the two other papers, with the process of 
resuming contact as a major topic. Novaya published several articles that tried to evaluate and 
analyze the development of the Russia-NATO relationship, and the process it had gone 





4.2 Preparing for analysis  
The overview given above may be seen as an introduction to the more in depth analysis, 
which follows in the next part of the chapter. By examining the overall development of the 
NATO debate, some remarks can be made with respect to the questions asked in the 
introduction. Firstly, this overview has given insight on the most important issues in the 
NATO debate, in terms of what both the official Russian newspaper and the two more 
independent papers have been preoccupied with during this period. This is why, in the next 
part the thesis will look at the aspect of the debate linked to perspectives on the enlargement 
of the alliance.  
Secondly, it can also be worth noting that the overview has shown that the debate 
to a large degree has followed the general trend where the level of tension rose from the initial 
years of Putin’s second presidency until it peaked in 2008. Then a period of decreasing level 
of tension, and attempts to normalize the Russia-NATO relationship, followed. This softening 
of relations also coincides with the time of the change in Russian presidency. The patterns and 
trends which have been illustrated in this short overview will be discussed more in depth in 
the chapter’s next part. By analyzing the main concerns of the debate about NATO, the aim is 
to reveal perspectives on the alliance that can be useful in the process of understanding how 


















Part two: Analysis of the debate 
 
4.3 The analysis 
As illustrated above, by looking at the overall development of the NATO debate in the three 
Russian newspapers from 2004 until 2010, some issues could be said to constitute the 
debate’s main concerns. Therefore, as already pointed out, the more in depth analysis of the 
debate that follows in this part, will treat the aspect of enlargement of NATO. The term 
enlargement reflects both the actual inclusion of new countries to NATO, as well as the 
increasing influence of the alliance in Russia’s “near abroad”.  
Thus, first perspectives on the 2004 enlargement will be treated, before turning to 
the battle for influence in the post-Soviet republics. As the possibility of memberships for 
Ukraine and Georgia was an important aspect of the debate, this issue is treated separately. 
Next, is the aspect of the debate concerned with NATO’s presence in the rest of Russia’s 
“near abroad”, mainly concerning the countries in Central Asia. As these issues also are 
linked to the aspect of the debate concerned with the CFE treaty and the ABM system in 
Eastern-Europe, this too will be assessed. The overview of the debate, seen in the previous 
part of this chapter, illustrated that all of the three papers shifted their focus from late 2008 
and especially during 2009 and 2010. This period displays interesting perspectives on NATO 
and the Russia-NATO relationship, which is in contrast with the views presented previously, 
and therefore, this period will be discussed separately. 
 
4.4 The Baltic countries  
By examining the articles that followed the 2004-enlargement of NATO, contours of patterns 
in arguments concerning NATO’s growing influence in the post-Soviet area can be detected. 
In the articles from Rossiskaya Gazeta, the inclusion of the Baltic countries into the alliance, 
as can be expected, was not welcomed. The perspective on how including the new countries 
would not increase stabilization in the Europe-Atlantic zone was obvious. In terms of fighting 
terrorism, for example, the official view was highlighted by quoting Putin’s advisor at the 
time, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who said that “we can understand the presence of NATO in 
Bulgaria or Romania in terms of the battle against terror. But there exists no such reason for 
presence in the Baltic” (rg.ru 2004.03.30). Furthermore, another negative aspect of the 
enlargement that could be seen in RG’s articles, was the perspective on how the inclusion of 
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the new members from the Baltic would lead to a spread of an anti-Russian ideology inside 
the alliance (rg.ru 2004.03.30).  
The perspective of NATO having anti-Russian features, and the image of the 
alliance as hostile towards Russia, may further be seen from articles treating the 2004 
enlargement. As an example, one article highlighted this underlying tension in the Russia-
NATO relationship by asking: “What is NATO to Russia today – a partner in the battle 
against common threats (meaning international terrorism) or an aggressive bloc which strives 
to surround us from all sides with military bases?” (rg.ru 2004.04.15).   
When analyzing these negative perspectives on the alliance and the perspectives 
on how NATO was imposing a threat to Russia by enlarging, it might be worth noting how 
Trenin (2007: 35) explains how the policymakers in Russia perceive countries or alliances 
with “substantial military potential” as a possible threat to the country. This displays a general 
perspective on foreign policy, which plays into the image of NATO as threatening to Russia. 
The enlargement of the alliance was also described as a process of a negative shift 
in balance of power (rg.ru 2004.04.15 and rg.ru 2004.04.01). The instability was seen as a 
result of how the Baltic countries had not signed the CFE treaty when entering the alliance. 
The focus on how the enlargement caused a negative shift in balance of power can be seen in 
relations to the political culture in the country influenced by zero-sum thinking. Petr 
Kratochvíl (2008: 407) sees this mind set as one of six norms that shapes Russia’s foreign 
policy.
23
 In political theory, a zero-sum game can be applied at different possible situations, 
but in terms of Russia’s foreign policy, it refers to the idea that one actor’s gain will cause the 
other actor to lose (Østerud 2007: 40). Thus, the enlargement was perceived as NATO’s gain, 
which necessarily meant causing a negative shift in balance for Russia.  
However, despite the overall negative attitude to the enlargement of NATO, the 
paper also had articles concerned with stating that even though the inclusion of the Baltic 
countries by no means increased stability in Europe, the most pressing danger to Russia’s 
security at the time was not the enlargement of NATO. An example is a quote by Victor 
Ozerov, the head of the Committee on Defense and Security in the Federation Council. When 
asked about the dangers of “enlargement of NATO eastward, the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorism” he answered that the main threat to Russian security at the time 
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main norms which has influenced Russia foreign policy. To read more, see Petr Kratochvíl’s article “The 




was indeed terrorism, and not NATO’s enlargement (rg.ru 2004.09.10). This put the event of 
2004 in perspective, and focused on looking ahead in the Russia-NATO relationship towards 
what united and not what separated them. In addition, president Putin’s diplomatic skills were 
highlighted. Since Russia was in no position to prevent the enlargement in 2004, focus 
seemed to be on what Putin actually could do instead of what he could not do, at the time.  
Looking at the issue of the Baltic countries in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, it was to a 
larger degree than RG concerned with treating the Russia-NATO relationship from different 
angles. As mentioned earlier, this has been done by including a wide range of Russian as well 
as foreign experts on the subject, in addition to the contribution of the papers’ journalists. 
This is how NG was able to highlight different aspects of the enlargement. For example, it 
offered articles that were critical to the very existence of NATO, with phrases such as: “It 
should be reborn or die” in an article written by the professor Aleksei D. Bugatorov (ng.ru 
2004.06.28). In a different article the relationship was described as deteriorating, as can be 
seen by quoting Vladimir Mukhin, a journalist frequently writing about NATO in the paper, 
“it seems that the contrasts between Russia and NATO increase by the day” (ng.ru 
2004.03.26). Further, in an article written by two of the paper’s journalists under the headline 
“The fuzzy Russia-NATO partnership”, difficulties in the relations were discussed, and the 
article pointed to the lack of the ratification of the CFE treaty by the Baltic countries as one of 
the main obstacles (ng.ru 2004.04.09). 
 Despite these negative perspectives, positive views were given room too. When 
assessing the articles written by foreign experts in NG, it became obvious that most of these 
presented positive perspectives on the Russia-NATO relationship. It is not to say that the only 
positive perspectives on the alliance were from foreigners, but their contributions were often 
emphasizing Russia’s possibilities that would result from NATO cooperation. One example of 
positive views on the future of Russia and NATO, can be seen in an article written by three 
foreign experts, Steven Miller from Harvard University, George Le Gelt from Institute of 
International and Strategic Studies in Paris and Gwyn Prins from London School of 
Economics. Their perspectives on the Russia-NATO relationship were presented in an article 
which stated that “the chance for Russia to integrate within the European security system has 
increased significantly” (ng.ru 2004.04.02). This was written at the same time as the official 
view in RG focused on how NATO’s enlargement was causing tension and instability, and 
their views may be seen as an attempt to balance out the negative perspectives at the time. 
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Further, an interesting aspect of the debate in NG was the evaluation on the 
enlargement by the paper’s journalist Mukhin. He criticized the Russian government for 
taking action too late in diplomatic terms “as in every aspect of Russian foreign policy” (ng.ru 
2004.04.05). However, what he seemed most disappointed about was how the Russian 
government acted too late in terms of hindering American and NATO activity in the post-
Soviet areas. This illustrates how critique of the Russian government’s handling of NATO 
issues goes hand in hand with perspectives on the importance of the “near abroad” in Russia. 
Further, in Novaya, the 2004-enlargement was treated in several articles, and two 
aspects of the debate may be said to be of special interest. First, is how the Russian 
government’s focus on how NATO’s enlargement posed a threat to Russia, was seen as 
exaggerated. One article, for example, went far in implying that the threat the enlargement 
posed was used to benefit those who worked within the system of protecting Russia from 
external dangers. The headline of this particular article was “The Battle with NATO – a 
Russian national game” meaning that the fear of NATO was not as real as the official Russian 
stand wanted it to seem (novayagazeta.ru 2004.04.05). The same article further pointed at 
how the battle between Russia and NATO had become a habitual game, which was played for 
fun and for economic reasons, rather than due to real fear of the alliance. The article even 
stated that “exaggeration of the “NATO-threat” concretely helps many important state 
officials live in luxury despite rather low official wages” (novayagazeta.ru 2004.04.05). 
Hence, the newspaper offered critique to the Russian system, rather than to NATO’s decision 
to expand eastward.  
Second, in Novaya, questions concerning the Russian government’s hang to act a 
certain way one day, and then differently another day were asked in relations to the 
enlargement. One example is an article that asked why suddenly the common maxima after 
the enlargement was “enemies at the gate” when “only yesterday we called each other 
partners in the “name of peace”” (novayagazeta.ru 2004.04.22). This aspect of the debate 
concerning Russia’s dual policy towards NATO may be seen in relations to its contradictory 
foreign policy on a general level. Fritz W. Ermarth is (2006: 7) describes the contradictory 
characteristics of Russian foreign policy as “defensiveness bordering to paranoia, on one 
hand, combined with assertiveness bordering on pugnacity, on the other”.24 The image of 
Russian foreign policy in terms of its dealings with NATO, where harsh rhetoric was 
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 Fritz W. Ermarth’s  article on  Russian strategic culture may be read for more information on the subject, 
“Russia`s strategic culture: past, present, and ... in transition” (2006). 
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combined with statements on the wish to cooperate, also reflects the notions made in chapter 
three on Russia’s disposition for untimely diplomacy. 
The 2004-enlargement was indeed seen as a tough blow for the Russian 
government, and was treated with interest in all of the three papers. However, as will be 
demonstrated in the following, the historical bonds which ties Russia together with Ukraine 
and Georgia, seemed to cause more worries in terms of their wish to integrate closer with 
NATO, than that of the Baltic countries. 
 
4.5 Ukraine and Georgia  
The NATO debate in the three papers to a large extent concerns the process of previous 
republics of the Soviet Union developing bonds with the West through the alliance. 
Therefore, the aspect of Ukrainian and Georgian memberships was an important part of the 
debate from 2004 until 2008. In terms of overall trends on this side of the debate, RG was 
preoccupied with whether and when Ukraine and Georgia would enter NATO. In terms of 
comment and analysis, as will be illustrated later, there seemed to be only two reasons why 
these countries would be interesting to NATO, and that was the alliance’s need to legitimize 
itself, and the need for resources for its mission in Afghanistan. When it comes to the overall 
trend in NG, the paper had numerous articles on this subject, which showed a variety of 
opinions. One of the clearest and most prominent perspective in NG, was the image of Russia 
pushing Ukraine and Georgia into the open arms of NATO, for example by giving Ukraine a 
triumph card with the gas dispute in 2006. In Novaya there were also several articles written 
on the subject, but the articles displayed skepticism to the whole debate about Georgian and 
Ukrainian memberships. They claimed that this was a constructed problem, pointing at how 
there was actually little chance that these two countries would be a part of the alliance at the 
time.  
In the following, the aspect of the NATO debate linked to Georgia and Ukraine 
will be divided to two, due to the amount of articles written on this subject. First, the debate in 
the initial years, from 2004 until 2006, will be treated. This was a rather calm period. 
However, during 2006 it began to show signs of the tension that was affecting the Russia-
NATO relationship at the time.  The next period, from 2007-2008 saw a development where 
the debate about possible Ukrainian and Georgian memberships reflected the overall level of 
increasing tensions in Russia-NATO relations. Together, perspectives on from the two 
periods illustrate the importance of these areas to Russia.  
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4.5.1 The initial years (2004-2006) 
In RG the development of Georgia and Ukraine building tighter bonds with NATO was not 
given major relevance in the initial years. For example, in 2005, Georgia’s wish to move 
closer to NATO was given some attention in one article, under the headline “Tbilisi hastens 
towards NATO” (rg.ru 2005.04.15). However, it only referred to a few statements made by 
the spokesman of the Georgian parliament, Nino Burjanadze. According to the article, she 
stated that the country would continue the process of integration with NATO, but this was left 
uncommented. In a different article later that year, however, the resistance to NATO’s plans 
of working closer with Ukraine towards a possible membership was given some attention, as 
it pointed at the fact that Brussels was well aware that Moscow did “not agree” with this 
development (rg.ru 2006.06.06). The overall negative view on the two countries’ wish to 
move closer to the West can be noticed, but it was stated in a rather mild tone. 
The gas dispute in 2006 was in RG not a major topic within the NATO debate, 
though it was treated. For example, one article looked at the statements made at NATO’s Riga 
summit, where energy security was on the agenda. The republican chairman from the 
American Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Richard Lugar, made a rather harsh 
statement on how Russia in 2006 was using energy as a weapon “for reaching political aims” 
(rg.ru 2006.11.29). His statement was commented by Sergei Karaganov, who replied that 
NATO’s new focus on energy security had to be seen in the light of NATO being an alliance 
which was striving to justify its own existence at the time (rg.ru 2006.11.29). Thus, protecting 
Ukraine from Russia was seen as the alliance new mission. 
In NG, several articles were written on the development that took place in Georgia 
and Ukraine in the initial years. Articles with headlines such as “Russians are leaving, NATO 
is entering” (ng.ru 2005.09.12) and “Orange directions” (ng.ru 2005.10.20) illustrate the 
image of NATO as taking over in areas where the main influence previously had been 
Russian, as well as the democratic movements in the two countries that caused their leaders to 
look elsewhere than towards Russia. 
However, although referred to in 2004-2005, the debate about possible Ukrainian 
and Georgian memberships peaked during 2006. And the gas dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine sparked it off. Two aspects of this side of the NATO debate are worth highlighting. 
The first is the perspective of Russian diplomacy failing in terms of its relationship with 
Ukraine. Under the headline “Moscow pushed Ukraine towards NATO” one of the paper’s 
journalists wrote that security in the energy sector had become increasingly important to 
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NATO at the time, and that the decision to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine did little more than 
to hand the Ukrainian leaders a triumph card in the process of entering the alliance (ng.ru 
2006.01.12). Further, Moscow was perceived as not having fully grasped the fact that Ukraine 
had chosen a “European perspective” and that the Russian “gas war” in fact “increased 
additional possibilities for Ukraine to enter NATO” (ng.ru 2006.01.12). Thus, NG again 
offered critique to the way Russian government was handling its relationship with previous 
members of the Soviet Union, pointing at how Russian leaders actually could blame 
themselves for this outcome.  
A second aspect of this side of the NATO debate worth treating, is how one article 
from NG analyzed Ukraine’s relationship to NATO in the light of Russia`s relationship with 
the alliance. Again, the paper’s journalist Mukhin contributed to the NATO debate as he 
wrote that both countries just as actively sought partnerships with the alliance, and that while 
“the Russian government on one side condemns the active contact between Kiev and NATO 
it, on the other side, pursues similar if not a greater amount of activities itself” (ng.ru 
2006.06.09). Hence, the image of Russia having right to a special role in NATO relations was 
criticized. 
Furthermore, as previously emphasized, NG is a paper that has published a range 
of perspectives on issues in the NATO debate. It published articles which projected both 
positive and negative images of NATO. One of the negative views reflects the image of 
NATO possessing anti-Russian features. This perspective can for example be seen in an 
article written by Konstantin Kosachev, the chairman of the Russian Duma’s Committee on 
International Affairs. Kosachev claimed that the “orange elites look at the alliance for 
protection against Russia” and that it was unfair that Russia’s negative position on Ukrainian 
membership had become synonymous with Russia being against democracy (ng.ru 
2006.11.27). In this particular article, the perspective of how it was about time that the leaders 
of NATO started seeing that Russia-NATO relations was not about “bad Russia” being 
against “good NATO” was also emphasized (ng.ru 2006.11.27).  
In NG there were several articles which countered the perspectives on how bad 
Russia-NATO relations were seen as the result of anti-Russian attitudes in NATO’s 
leadership. One example is an article written by Mikhail G. Delyagin, a Russian expert in 
economics. He treated the development of Ukrainian’s direction away from Russia from a 
different angle. In his article, Ukraine’s choice to move closer to NATO was presented as a 
result of it being the only possibility for closer integration with the West. Further, in the 
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article Delyagin pointed at to how, at the time, Russia struggled because in a modern world 
the number of “tanks and money” was not as important as “symbols of development”, of 
which he claimed Russia had none (ng.ru 2006.10.23). This made Russia less of an alternative 
than the West, which he stated was why countries such as Ukraine chose the Western model 
instead of the Russian. He ended his article by noting that when Russia had dealt with its own 
problems and become “a symbol, a model and a public example of modern and global 
development” then NATO’s enlargements would be just as urgent as “the enlargement of the 
Golden Hordes” (ng.ru 2006.10.23). By referring to the Mongol invasion of Russia 800 years 
ago, he makes a clear point about the importance of Russia’s path in the future in terms of its 
development. The question about Ukrainian membership in NATO was used to illustrate that 
the real question was not when it would happen, but why. And according to Delyagin it was 
because Russia at this time was not able to offer what Ukraine sought.  
In addition to articles which discussed the motives behind the wish to apply for 
NATO memberships, there were also articles that discussed the actual chances for the two 
countries to become members of the alliance. It was indeed seen as rather unrealistic that 
either Ukraine or NATO would become members of the alliance in the nearest future (ng.ru 
2006.09.11). Georgia’s path into a possible membership was described as long, and the 
negative stand from the Russian government on subject was described (ng.ru 2006.09.20).  
In articles from Novaya the possibility of Ukrainian and Georgian memberships 
was not that frequently treated in the initial years. However, it did give some comments on the 
development of previous Soviet republics looking towards the West. The process of NATO’s 
enlargement was for example described as a “nightmare” which had come true to the Russian 
government (novayagazeta.ru 2005.04.25a). Furthermore, countries such as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan were expected to follow along the same path as the three countries in the Baltic. 
This aspect of the debate was further highlighted and Ukraine’s wish to enter NATO was used 
as an example to illustrate the development of previous loyal states turning away from Russia 
and towards the West (novayagazeta.ru 2006.06.01). One perspective that can be seen in the 
NATO debate in Novaya that is not present in the other papers, was how several articles were 
preoccupied with the only alternative Russia would have left if its neighbors continued to turn 
its back to it, namely Belarus. This perspective was emphasized repeatedly in the paper, and 
as one article pointed out, there was indeed a fear that the development would lead to 
“isolation in the north-eastern corner of Europe” where the Russian and Belorussian 
governments would build a “stronghold against any orange revolution” (novayagazeta.ru 
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2005.04.25a). Thus, the articles from Novaya show awareness over the development of how 
previous allies from the time of the Soviet Union decided to turn towards the West. However, 
instead of criticizing the Russian government for its lack of ability to keep on to its influence 
in these areas, it criticizes the direction it fears Russia will take, and that is the direction of 
isolation together with Belarus. 
 
4.5.2 Rising tensions (2007-2008) 
Tensions between Russia and the West were rising steadily towards the summer of 2008. The 
aspect of the NATO debate concerning Ukraine and Georgia in RG reflected this 
development. Moreover, articles from this period displayed perspectives on the alliance that is 
worth assessing closer. One perspective that became clear in the debate about NATO’s 
enlargement into the areas of previous Soviet republics was the image of US leading the 
alliance on this expanding mission, which can be exemplified by a quote from one article that 
pointed at how “the White House has always supported the idea of enlargement NATO” 
(rg.ru 2007.03.28).  
Furthermore, as mentioned, from reading articles in RG, one could see how there 
was an image of Ukraine as important to NATO due to the alliance’s new energy security 
mission in Europe. However, the perspective in 2008 had changed somewhat, and now 
Ukraine was seen as interesting by the alliance as a result of its need of resources for its 
mission in Afghanistan. One example of this attitude can be seen by looking at an article by 
Yevgeni Koshokin, the director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. He pointed at 
how NATO was struggling in Afghanistan at the time and that Ukrainian talk about wanting 
to support NATO in terms of antiterrorist operations meant “that Ukrainian troops will be sent 
to Afghanistan” (rg.ru 2008.01.17). Karaganov, furthermore, described the Ukrainian leaders’ 
initiative to integrate with NATO as “playing with fire” and pointed at the nature of the 
alliance as one that leads military-political confrontations. Thus, the Ukrainian people would 
suffer the faith as “cannon fodder” if they were to become members (rg.ru 2008.03.26). These 
are rather harsh words and illustrate the feelings that were provoked when Ukraine, a previous 
partner, decided make a change in its priorities looking towards the West.  
The importance of the Bucharest summit in April 2008 and the numbers of 
articles concerned with this aspect of the debate was highlighted in the overview of the 
debate’s main issues. This was, as described earlier, when the decision on memberships for 
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Georgia and Ukraine was made. The negative answers to the requests was by Russian 
delegation at the summit seen as “winning a battle” but not the “war” (rg.ru 2008.04.05). The 
“battle” was Ukrainian and Georgian memberships, which NATO would reassess later in 
December the same year, while the “war” reflects the perspective on NATO as a continuing 
expanding alliance.  
The importance of the possibility of Ukrainian and Georgian NATO memberships 
can also be highlighted by referring to an article written just before the decision on 
memberships was made in April. It pointed at how “much is depending on the answer to this 
question. Not only on Russia`s relationship with the organization in the future, but also 
Russia’s relationship with the US and the European Union” (rg.ru 2008.04.02). Furthermore, 
there is one article in particular, on the topic of possible memberships for Ukraine and 
Georgia, which may say to break with the image of RG as a newspaper that offers little if any 
critical analysis of the foreign policy in terms of its relationship with NATO. The article is 
based on interview RG made with a representative for the European Parliament, Marek 
Siwiec. The first question asked was linked to the possible memberships of Ukraine and 
Georgia, and the consequences it might have on the Russia-European relationship. One of the 
points made by Siwiec answering this question was how Russia’s relationship with the 
alliance seemed as though built upon a policy characterized as having “split personalities” 
(rg.ru 2008.04.15). The aspect of Russian foreign policy as contradictory have been pointed 
out at several occasions in both NG and Novaya, but this one of the very few places such 
remarks was observed in RG. This is not a comment made on Russian foreign policy by a 
journalist in RG, but still it was rather striking that the Siwiec’s statement was published in 
the paper and it broke with a pattern in RG where Kremlin’s policy was either not 
commented, or commented in positive terms. 
By looking at how the war with Georgia was treated as a part of the NATO debate 
in RG, some remarks on official perspectives on the alliance can be made. As stated in the 
overview of the debate, the war in Georgia was not treated as a part of the NATO debate to a 
large extent. However, one interesting aspect may be seen from how Dmitri Medvedev was 
described as not seeing anything frightening about NATO deciding to break off contact with 
Russia as a result of the war. Also, in the eyes of the Russian government, it was NATO that 




The attitudes on the suspension of formal contact through the NRC, which was the 
consequence of Russia’s conflict with Georgia in relations to NATO, may be seen in terms of 
Russia’s political culture. According to Ermarth (2006: 6), in terms of solving conflicts in 
Russia, this is influenced by a hang to do so by using methods such as force, picking fights 
and plotting, while methods such as voting and negotiation is less used in Russian foreign 
policy. This might also be seen in relations to Neumann and Pouloit’s notions on Russia’s 
untimely diplomacy. Thus, a situation as the one that occurred after the war with Georgia was 
maybe not perceived as being as dramatic in Kremlin as it was in Brussels.  
Towards the end of the year, the atmosphere seemed changed. For example, 
Karaganov highlighted that “bad peace is always better that confrontations” in an article under 
the headline “Do we need NATO?” (rg.ru 2008.12.10). This might be said to represent an 
approach which in NG and Novaya was presented much clearer, namely that isolation during 
the fall of 2008 did not provide Russia with more than what a partnership did.  
In NG the debate about Georgia and Ukraine displayed some of the same 
perspectives on the US’s role in NATO considering its interest for including Ukraine and 
Georgia into the alliance. For example under the telling headline: “Multispeed integration, the 
US will pay for Georgian and Ukrainian tickets into NATO” (ng.ru 2007.03.28). This article 
held a clear resemblance to the article in RG, which stated that the US always had been in 
favor of eastward enlargement of the alliance. Hence, there seems to be coinciding attitudes 
on the US role as initiating the process of making Ukraine and Georgian NATO-members.  
In contrast to RG, however, NG was not as preoccupied with the possibility of 
NATO memberships for Georgia and Ukraine, possibly due to a more realistic approach to 
the issue. However, several articles did display a rising level of tensions between Russia and 
NATO at the time. In order to illustrate the perspectives on the level of tension, an article 
from the end of 2007 can be used. This article, just as the one above from RG, looked at 
Russia-US relations as closely linked to Russia-NATO relations. It looked at different 
challenges, which made the Russia-NATO relationship a strained one. However, it was not 
the article itself that described these problems; it was a picture of Sergei Lavrov and 
Condoleezza Rice and the text underneath this picture. Their rather solemn expressions 
coincided with the impression from the article, and underneath, Lavrov and Rice was 
described as “not tuned in on the same frequency” (ng.ru 2007.12.10). This indeed fit the 
overall Russia-US relationship, but also the Russia- NATO relationship at the time. A 
solution to the problems was not expected to be found any time soon, and the perspective on 
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how the distance between the alliance and Russia at the end of the year was perceived to be 
significant, could be seen. 
The war with Georgia in 2008 was to a certain degree treated as a part of the 
NATO debate in NG. As tensions were rising in the Russia-NATO relationship towards the 
middle of 2008, there were articles that stated that the war with Georgia was indeed a very 
serious event in the Russia-NATO relationship. In an article from August 2008, the war was 
described as “the second most serious event in the relationship between the Russian 
Federation and NATO since the end of the Cold War” (ng.ru 2008.08.18). The other event 
here referred to is the NATO bombing of Beograd during the Kosovo war in 1999, which was 
when Russia broke all contact with NATO through the PJC.  
Furthermore, the summer of 2008 is in a different article referred to as “the Cold 
Summer” giving immediate associations to the Cold War (ng.ru 2008.08.29). However, the 
article’s focus was not on what separated Russia and NATO at this point in time, when 
tension really had build up between Russia and the alliance for years. There were actually 
several articles in 2008 that focused on the positive aspects of further cooperation with 
NATO, due to their common threats. For example, in one of the articles where this was the 
subject, the situation as was described as how “today there exists common and dangerous 
enemies for Moscow, Washington and Brussels” and that “without a doubt they will exist also 
tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow”, pointing out a common platform of interests (ng.ru 
2008.08.29). These positive and hopeful aspects on Russia-NATO relations at this moment 
can be seen as attempts to emphasize that despite disagreements on smaller matters, the 
countries of NATO and Russia still faced many of the same threats, which made cooperation 
valuable.  
This focus illustrates the period that followed. At the end of the year, an editorial 
pointed at how even though there were many differences between Russia and the alliance at 
the time, they still stood “before a number of common threats”, and that if the leaders on 
Moscow, Brussels and Washington were able to see past their own political ambitions, then 
maybe Medvedev was right when asked about the possibility of Russia membership in NATO 
had answered: “never say never” (ng.ru 2008.11.21).  
Thus, towards the end of the year, the image of cooperation with NATO was seen 
as better than isolation. This was also seen in articles from Novaya were the possibility of 
isolation for Russia was treated as an important aspect of the NATO debate. Moreover, 
perspectives presented in articles from Novaya on the possibility of Ukrainian and Georgian 
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memberships in NATO can be worth assessing closer as they displayed some important views 
on the alliance. One such perspective is how the speculations on whether Georgia would enter 
either NATO or the EU at that time were seen as unrealistic. Georgian hopes and the Russian 
fears of NATO membership were seen as created by the leaders of each country and used as a 
political tool against each other. Furthermore, on NATO’s decision not to accept the Georgian 
and Ukrainian requests in April 2008, what was described as “Putin’s diplomatic victory” was 
criticized, due to how it was never really expected that they would get a positive answer in the 
first place. However, there were also perspectives on this process that described the 
possibility for memberships of the countries as premature, but even though at this time it was 
too early, if the development continued, their path would lead to memberships in the end 
(novayagazeta.ru 2008.04.07). Furthermore, despite the perspective of how a membership in 
EU or NATO was perceived as unrealistic, one article pointed at the importance of the 
“strategic choice” Georgia had taken (novayagazeta.ru 2007.03.01). A choice, which would 
not give immediate NATO membership but one that soon, would make it a part of the West.  
Furthermore, as in previous years, the Russia-Belarus relationship was also at this 
time looked upon with skepticism. The country was seen as the only partner Russia would 
have left, if the assertive Russian foreign policy continued to make previous allies turn to the 
West (novayagazeta.ru 2007.12.17).  
Another perspective worth treating on the alliance from articles in Novaya may be 
found from the time of the Bucharest summit in April 2008. As seen in RG, the development 
of previous Soviet republics looking towards NATO was perceived as a negative trend. In 
NG, both positive and negative perspectives have been visible. However, in NG to a certain 
degree, there were opinions that reflected the official stand in terms of the importance of the 
“near abroad”. These also criticized how the Russian government had not been able to secure 
Russian interests in these areas.  
In contrast to both RG and NG, articles from Novaya described this trend as a 
possibility for Russia. For example, the development that was taking place in these countries 
was described as an example to be followed. For example, one article pointed out that it was 
about time the Russian government looked “at our neighbors’ structure of integration with the 
West as a bridge towards a liberal civilization that should help Russia towards taking the 
same course” (novayagazeta.ru 2008.08.06). The Ukrainian and Georgian integration with 
NATO was also described as a tool to measure the approach to liberal democracy in Russia. 
This meant that those who opposed the development of integration also opposed the wish for 
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democratic values. Furthermore, as a rather strong appeal only months before the break in 
relations between Russia and NATO on article saw  “integration with the West” as “the only 
way out of the “deadlock” in which Russia is stuck” (novayagazeta.ru 2008.08.06).  
Moreover, articles from Novaya displayed fear of Russian isolation as a result of 
the conflict with Georgia. This may be seen as a reaction to the hopes of closer integration 
with the West displayed only months before. The possibility and fear of isolation was 
described in several articles, and one saw the situation after the war with Georgia as similar to 
the “ring of hostile isolation” which followed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
(novayagazeta.ru 2008.08.25 and 2008.08.21).  
Further, on the issue of the war and on the consequences it had for Russia’s 
relationship with NATO, president Medvedev’s statement seen in RG on how the suspension 
of formal contact was not perceived as dramatic in Moscow, was criticized. One article also 
asked a rhetoric question on whether the ruling elite in Russia had forgotten what happened 
“last time our country came out of a cold war?” pointing to how it had caused the USSR to 
break into pieces, hinting that maybe this time around, a new approach ought to be preferred 
(novayagazeta.ru 2008.09.01). 
Perhaps one of the most important examples of how articles from Novaya 
represented voices of opposition, was the perspective on the underlying motives for Russia to 
use military power in the conflict with Georgia. Georgia’s regional conflicts were one of the 
main reasons for it not being considered ready for deeper integration with the NATO, and as 
the article pointed out, by reaching a level of armed conflict in the areas of South-Ossetia and 
Abkhazia there was no doubt that Georgia’s case in terms of regional disturbances would be 
extensively worsened (novayagazeta.ru 2008.08.10). Hence, the paper gives an analysis of the 
war which would be unimaginable in RG. Like in the two other papers, the focus in 2009 and 
2010 seemed to be changing also in Novaya. Articles that looked back, evaluated and looked 
forward seem to mark a new beginning in Russia-NATO relations. 
After having treated the subject of possible memberships for Ukraine and Georgia 
into the alliance, it might be worth noting that there was indeed a third round of NATO 
enlargement in 2009, where Croatia and Albania were admitted. This was treated in the 
NATO debate in the Russian papers, but compared to the debate on the possibility of 
memberships for the two previous members of the Soviet Union, it is clear that the battle for 
influence in Russia’s “near abroad” has a special status in the debate. 
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Before taking a closer look at the changes that occurred after the break between 
Russia and NATO in 2008, the importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus will be discussed 
in order to highlight several important aspects of the NATO debate in Russia, both in terms of 
influence in post-Soviet areas, but also the perceived image of Russia as a nation of initiative 
in world politics. 
 
4.6 Central Asia and Caucasus 
The debate about NATO in the three chosen newspapers, have to a varying degree focused on 
the previous Soviet republics in Central Asia and Caucasus. For RG, the trend was that the 
CIS countries were mentioned in relations to cooperation through the CSTO, where the 
Russian initiative for cooperation between the two, was emphasized. In NG and Novaya the 
articles about these countries in relations to NATO was linked to the debate about how 
Russia’s previous allies were turning towards the West and a deeper integration with NATO.  
Two important perspectives on NATO and Russia’s relationship with the alliance 
were reflected in the debate about the countries of Central Asia in RG’s articles. First is the 
image of Putin as a man of initiative and the importance of Russian diplomacy in international 
relations. One example of how RG was concerned with presenting the Russian leadership as 
one of inventiveness and strength, can be seen by using an article that demonstrated the 
diplomatic skills of Putin as an example. Under the headline “Putin prepared a plan for 
NATO” it described how Putin, after a meeting with the CSTO, presented NATO’s secretary 
general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer with a plan for cooperation with NATO in the battle against 
drug trafficking (rg.ru 2005.06.25).  
However, as the Russian initiatives were not met with the same enthusiasm with 
which they were presented, articles seemed preoccupied with the lack of response to the 
Russian initiative. This issue was for example approached in an interview with the NATO 
representative John Forne, who was present at a conference on Russia-NATO relations in St. 
Petersburg. One of the main questions asked was why NATO would not cooperate with the 
CSTO (rg.ru 2006.02.21). Further, Russia’s importance as a partner to NATO through the 
CSTO was linked to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. The aspect of how Russia could offer 
assistance for its mission in Afghanistan through the operations Russia was doing with the 
CSTO in the region at the time was highlighted (rg.ru 2007.02.10).  This displayed an image 




Second, another image of Russia’s role in international relations can also be seen 
in relations to the CSTO. The perspective on Russia as an equal to NATO can be seen from 
the aspirations it had for NATO to deal with the CSTO as a whole, not through bilateral 
cooperation with its members. The CSTO, with Putin as a powerful initiator at the lead, hence 
reflects the image of Russia having a determining role in international politics. 
NG published a large number of articles concerned with the aspect of the NATO 
debate linked to the countries in Central Asia. As described previously, this side of the debate 
mainly concerned the development of previous Soviet republics’ shifts in loyalty from Russia 
to the West. Furthermore, as on most issues, the paper has published articles that saw this 
development as devastating, as well as offering new possibilities to Russia. 
One example of negative perspectives on NATO’s presence in the region can be 
found in an article written by Aleksei D. Bogatyrov who introduced the term “asiatization” 
[aziatizatsiya]. It was used to reflect the growing influence of NATO in the areas, which he 
strongly opposed (ng.ru 2004.06.28). A second example can be found in an interview from 
2005, with Semen A. Bagdasarov, an expert on Central Asia. A journalist from NG wanted to 
know why the republics of the former USSR were “with such joy running into the arms of the 
European Union and NATO?” (ng.ru 2005.03.18). The expert blamed this development on 
Western colonialism and emphasized the special role inhabited by Russia in these areas. 
Furthermore, in addition to displaying negative perspectives on the growing interest of NATO 
in the region, Bagdasarov’s statements may also be said to present a perspective based on 
“messianism” in Russian foreign policy culture. This term reflects the idea about how Russia 
has a mission “beyond security and prosperity for the country” (Ermarth 2006: 6). The 
different Russian epochs have had different such missions, and the idea of Moscow as the 
third Rome and Soviet as the initiator of a worldwide socialist revolution, are two examples. 
In the interview, Bagdasarov displayed his believes in how Russia, as a country existing 
between the West and the East, should take on the role as a mediator or a “bridge” between 
the Islamic republics of Central-Asia and the West (ng.ru 2005.03.18).  
Furthermore, there were also examples of positive perspectives on NATO’s role 
in Central Asia. One example is the article by Vadim Solovyev, the editor of NG’s 
supplementary issue “Independent Military Review”. According to him, the presence of 
NATO and the US in Central Asia was in fact not a liability to Russia, but could be seen as an 
advantage. Since the threats and challenges in the region hardly could be fought and 
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overcome by Russia alone, cooperation in these areas should have been perceived as 
beneficial, not threatening (ng.ru 2004.08.18).  
The perspective on the case of NATO’s increased attention on the areas of the 
previous Soviet republics in Caucasus and Central Asia confirm the impression of the 
importance of Russia’s “near abroad”. In addition, it may be worth noting how the journalist 
Mukhin from NG criticizes the Russian government’s lack of ability to secure Russian 
interests in these areas. For example, in the article “Russia and NATO: confrontations are 
only beginning” Mukhin wrote that “the CIS countries prefer the West” and that one should 
not just pay attention to the growth in military presence of the alliance in the region at the 
time, but also on how the relationships between Russia and the CIS countries had changed 
(ng.ru 2004.04.05). In terms of critique of this development, he further stated that “the 
diplomacy of Moscow is either not able to realize what danger foreign military presence in 
Central Asia imposes, or it, as it is called, puts up a good face whilst playing a bad game” 
(ng.ru 2005.10.24).  
Moreover, as the tensions increased between Russia and NATO towards 2008, 
several perspectives worth assessing on the alliance from articles concerning the battle for 
influence in the region, may be noted. First, is the image of NATO as an untrustworthy 
alliance as a result of the alleged promise given from NATO not to enlarge eastwards. This 
can for example be seen in an article from the end of 2006, which stated that during the period 
of Sergei Ivanov, at the time he was Deputy Prime Minister, confrontations reminding of 
those of the Cold War was revived. This was a result of how the alleged promise given by 
NATO was broken. The article pointed at how in 2006 several of the previous members of the 
Warsaw Pact had entered NATO, and that this clearly showed how the alliance was not to be 
trusted (ng.ru 2006.12.04).  
Further, in an article that described the possibility of placing French airplanes, 
meaning NATO airplanes from a Russian perspective, together with Russian airplanes on the 
same military base in Tajikistan, was seen as synonymous with “giving up its geopolitical 
leadership in the region” (ng.ru 2007.09.12). Also, the process of Armenian integration with 
the West and possible development of tighter bonds with NATO was described as though 
Russia was “losing its main, if not its only partner in Caucasus” (ng.ru 2007.02.02). This may 
be said both to illustrate the perceived importance of these areas to Russia, as well as the 
image of NATO as a threat and a competitor in the region. 
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As the level of tension increased up to 2008 with the war in Georgia, the battle for 
influence in Central Asia became less of a focus in the NATO debate. In the aftermath of the 
war, the region was first and foremost mentioned in terms of possible cooperation through the 
CSTO and the challenges linked to a new path in the Russia-NATO relationship. 
There are not as many articles on this subject in Novaya as in NG. However, they 
also treated the NATO debate linked to the development of change in the loyalty of previous 
allies from the Soviet Union. For example, as can be seen from one article where the 
development in Kazakhstan was treated and the question of how long it would continue to be 
one of Russia’s most trustworthy partners, was asked (novayagazeta.ru 2006.06.01). The 
aspect of great power aspirations in Russia-NATO relations can for example be seen in an 
article where the perspectives of two experts are given on the subject, one of them a professor 
in History, Dmitri Furman. He viewed Russia’s attempt to remain in control of the previous 
Soviet states through the CIS as “the third and last form of organization of the Russian 
empire” where Russia tried to hold on to the “illusion of tranquility” (novayagazeta.ru 
2007.02.12). Thus, the article contributed to the debate by analyzing Russia’s interests in the 
region as one based on its great power aspirations. Furman further pointed out that 
understanding the motives behind Russia’s foreign policy would be as difficult as to 
understand any “personal motives”, implying that decisions made in Russia on foreign policy 
were made by those seeking to enhance their personal positions. In addition, he offered a 
description of the emotions felt by the Russian leadership when the countries in of Central 
Asia, and other areas perceived as belonging to Russia’s special sphere of influence, wanted 
to seek integration with others than Russia, such as EU and NATO. In his view this indeed 
caused both “pain and jealousy” to Moscow, emphasizing the importance of these regions to 
the Russian elite (novayagazeta.ru 2007.02.12).  
After the war in Georgia, there seemed to be an understanding of how the process 
of previous Soviet republics seeking integration with the West through NATO would 
continue. As suggested in an article from Novaya, the future of the Russia-NATO relationship 
was dependent on how Russia would deal with its previous satellites’ ”flirting” with the 
alliance (novayagazeta.ru 2009.01.27).  
Before looking at the process of NATO and Russia resuming contact after the war 
with Georgia, a short look at the debate about the CFE treaty and the ABM system can further 




4.7 The CFE treaty and the ABM system 
When the Baltic States entered NATO in 2004, they did so without having ratified the CFE 
treaty, which, as pointed out previously, was seen by the Russian government as causing a 
negative shift in balance in terms of security.  
In RG, the fact that several countries in Europe had not signed the treaty in 2004 
was indeed described as jeopardizing the stability of the whole continent (rg.ru 2004.04.01). 
An interesting aspect of this debate is how the official view on Russia’s fulfillment of the 
requirements of the revised treaty from Istanbul was stated in an article from 2006. In the 
interview with the NATO representative John Forne, as also referred to above, the journalist 
from RG asked why the members of NATO had not ratified the new CFE treaty. The NATO 
official answered that NATO believed that the treaty was perceived as a “cornerstone” in 
European security, but due to how Russia still had not fulfilled its commitments concerning 
the removal of Russian troops from Georgia and the Moldavian region of Transnistria, the 
official position in NATO was to wait. The Russian journalists replied that “Russia is 
convinced that it has fully followed the commitments of the Istanbul treaty”, displaying a 
perspective of how Russia has a different approach to security and cooperation than NATO. 
As in the words of Forne: “on this question the Russian foreign minister and the ministers of 
Western countries disagree” (rg.ru 2006.02.21).  
Further, the rising tensions in the Russia-NATO relations may also be reflected in 
the debate about the CFE treaty as Russia decided to put a moratorium on the treaty in 2007. 
This was the same year as the debate about an AMB system was included in the NATO 
debate in the paper. In combination, these two issues contributed to the sense of an increased 
level of tension in the debate. As an example, an article that described a Russia-NATO 
meeting can be used. Here, Scheffer’s statement about how Russia and NATO needed each 
other, which was why dialogue between the two was so important, was commented on as it 
pointed to how “lately dialogue seems more like two monologues” (rg.ru 2007.06.26). 
According to the article, these two monologues played out in the opposing positions between 
Russia and NATO on “the ABM system in Europe, on enlargement on the alliance eastward, 
on Kosovo and the CFE treaty” (rg.ru 2007.06.26).  
Furthermore, in addition to focus on the increased tension between Russia and 
NATO, the possibility of an AMB system in Europe was seen as causing a split within 
NATO, between Europe on one side and the US on the other (rg.ru 2007.03.14). This 
perspective is worth noting as Russia was presented with the powers to cause internal raptures 
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in the alliance. This approach can also be seen on the issue of the Russian government’s 
decision to put a moratorium on the CFE treaty. Here, the fact that the countries within NATO 
could not agree on a common response to this act was discussed (rg.ru 2007.12.07). Further, 
the division between the “old” and the “new” Europe was pointed out through the 
disagreement on the prospects of Ukrainian and Georgian memberships, but also on the 
different opinions on the AMB system, which also was seen as splitting the organization 
(rg.ru 2008.04.02). This aspect, where Russia was able to cause disagreement and splits 
within NATO, may be seen as a way to present the alliance as weak, and to show how Russia 
could impose on its policy. 
In NG the CFE treaty was also initially discussed in relations to the inclusion of 
the three Baltic countries in NATO. This was treated by looking at how the Russian 
government was showing concern over the fact that these three countries had not ratified the 
treaty and the possible consequences this could have, especially in terms of NATO patrolling 
the Baltic airspace (ng.ru 2004.04.09). As in RG, the problems and disagreement concerning 
the CFE treaty seemed to be of major interest in 2007, which is also when the issue of the 
ABM system was brought into the NATO debate. And just as in RG, the level of rising was 
detectible. But in contrast to RG, articles from NG seemed to counter the increased level of 
tension with suggestions on how the situation could be turned to the better for Russia. One 
example of this positive approach is an article written by Alexander Khramchikhin, an expert 
from the Institute of Political and Military Analysis. In his eyes, the planned ABM system in 
combination with plans of further enlargement of NATO, including Ukraine and Georgia, 
gave Russia a diplomatic advantage. This diplomatic lead could, according to him, be 
beneficial in terms of reaching a new agreement on the CFE treaty (NG.ru 2007.03.30). 
Hence, instead of withdrawing from the treaty, Khramchikhin suggested that there was a 
possibility for reaching an agreement by the use of diplomacy.  
However, since this was not the method chosen in the end, and the moratorium on 
the CFE became a fact, several articles showed a continued support for agreement - not 
increasing level of tensions. This aspect of the debate can for example be seen in the article 
“Dangerous Moratorium” where NG’s journalist wrote that “of course, better than to 
unilaterally withdraw from the treaty would be to come to an agreement on solutions in the 
field of disarmament” (ng.ru 2007.12.28). This statement reflects disappointment in terms of 
the failure of Russian diplomacy.  
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Furthermore, NATO and Russia’s different approaches to security were discussed 
in terms of the disagreement over the CFE treaty. Russia’s choice to withdraw from the CFE 
treaty and NATO’s response to this action was seen as illustrating these differences. 
Moreover, Kremlin’s foreign policy was described as a mix between sharp rhetoric and 
statements on its will to cooperate. This form of diplomacy was perceived as a style that not 
only would have consequences for the Bucharest summit, which were to take place shortly 
after, but also on the Russia-NATO relationship in the future (ng.ru 2008.02.14). This again 
touches upon the perspective on how the Russian diplomacy seen as something different from 
the Western. 
Further, another interesting feature of the NATO debate in NG, linked to the CFE 
treaty, was the already mentioned aspect of fear of isolation, as seen in articles from Novaya. 
In an article written by Major General Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, a professor from the Russian 
Academy of Sciences (RAS), the image of the West as a threat was countered by pointing at 
how this image to a large degree was the result official propaganda (ng.ru 2008.04.24).  He 
saw a need to discuss what actually imposed a threat to Russia at the time, as can be seen 
from the article’s headline “Fictional or real threats”. According to Dvorkin, what really 
threatened the country were confrontations and a following break in relations with the West. 
This, he further claimed, would leave Russia isolated and on the outside of the sphere of 
NATO and outside a security system, without the ability to contribute and influence to its 
development (ng.ru 2008.04.24). This display a fear of isolation as a result of Russia’s foreign 
policy, as well as it criticizes the image of the West as a threat to Russia.  
The same critique is found in the NATO debate in Novaya, where the official 
image of threats from the West was also described as propaganda, rather than posing any real 
danger. One article, written in July 2007 when the conflict on the CFE treaty was rising 
towards a peak, claimed that the statements given by Russian officials on how Russia 
followed the demands of the CFE treaty, whilst NATO broke them and “continued to increase 
its arsenal” were actually incorrect (novayagazeta.ru 2007.07.16). The article pointed out that 
Europe and the US in fact had built down their armies, and it used the example of how the 
number of American troops in Europe had decreased from 600 thousand in 1991 down to 60 
thousand in 2007, arguing that the image of the alliance building up was a false one. It went 
far in implying that the choice to withdraw from the CFE treaty would not be beneficial to 
Russia. Indeed it stated that this would not just strengthen the other members “solidarity 
towards the US” it would also “significantly weaken Russia’s security” (novayagazeta.ru 
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2007.07.16). Thus, the article may be said to have claimed that Russian diplomacy was only 
making the situation worse, again offering new angels that were in opposition to the official 
views in the NATO debate.  
Furthermore, the high level of tension at the time was described as being the result 
of a number of separate events, which combined soured the relationship. One article saw the 
trouble with the CFE, the killing of Aleksander Litvinenko, disagreement over American 
bases in Europe and the dispute over the independence of Kosovo, as all being uncomfortable 
episodes, and made a point by stating that they were no more than that - by themselves. 
However, together they created “discontent and distrust” and that this pulled “the relationship 
to the West in to the realm of total conflict” (novayagazeta.ru 2007.07.30). The period that 
followed in 2009-2010 displayed a less tense approach to the Russia-NATO relationship, 
which will be illustrated next. 
After having studied the debate about NATO from 2004 until 2008 in the three 
different newspapers, two remarks can be made. Firstly, the debate about NATO reflects the 
major events that had an apparent news value at the time and the increasingly tense 
environment in which Russia-NATO relations were developing in. Second, the debate has 
displayed several perspectives and images of the alliance and the nature of the Russia-NATO 
relationship.  
In the following, the debate from the end of 2008 until the end of 2010 is 
assessed, as the focus of the debate changed, as illustrated in the overview. The papers still 
reported about happenings important to the Russia-NATO relationship, but the point of view 
seems to have altered, as it is the process of resuming contact and finding back together again 
that was of main importance. Moreover, this displays some new perspectives on NATO.  
 
4.8 Russia and NATO reconnecting 
Almost surprisingly early, already in late 2008, the Russian newspapers all have articles about 
the prospects of reconnecting with NATO after the break that followed the conflict with 
Georgia. From then on, and towards the Lisbon summit in November 2010, all three papers 
have numerous of articles treating the future of the Russia-NATO relationship. 
 Before studying the debate more closely, it may be worth noting some general 
trends during this period. In RG, the term “reset” [perezagruzka] and how a good relationship 
with Russia was important both for the US and for NATO at the time was treated frequently. 
A mild sense of optimism may be detected, especially around the time of the Lisbon summit 
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as the paper’s articles referred to positive and hopeful statements made by both Russian and 
NATO officials. In NG, several articles displayed skepticism in terms of the Russia-NATO 
future to a larger degree than in RG, at least in 2009. However towards the end of 2010 some 
optimism and hope was noticed. The trend in Novaya seems to follow that in NG, with 
articles offering sober analysis of the Russia-NATO relationship. Thus, even though outright 
optimism and positive notes on NATO and the Russia-NATO relationship may not always be 
found explicitly in the papers’ articles, it was evident that in the period between 2009 and 
2010, there was less focus on the issues that previously had caused a sense of a high level of 
tension in the relationship. 
Several perspectives worth assessing on the alliance and the Russia-NATO 
relationship may be found in the debate from late 2008 until the end of 2010 in RG. For 
example, at the end of the year in 2008, RG published an article that wrote a short comment 
on the decision made by NATO to resume contact with Moscow after cooperation had been 
suspended (rg.ru 2008.12.04). Remarks and comments were left out, but in an article written 
by Karaganov shortly after, a more personal tone was offered. According to him, some 
characteristics of the alliance were worth discussing as the contact with Russia would be 
resumed. Firstly, he pointed at how the development during the last decade had shown that 
NATO had returned to what Karaganov called “a classical aggressive alliance” due to the 
operations it had led outside the alliance’s territory. Secondly, he claimed that in the last 
couple of years NATO had included countries whose leaders’ wanted “revenge for their 
failures and defeats in the previous centuries” which resulted in them bringing their “anti-
Russian” sentiments into the alliance. Thirdly, he wrote that despite claims from the alliance 
that it had changed, it largely remained the same organization that it had been during the Cold 
War. In addition, he also claimed that NATO had “revived the confidence of Europe, 
especially in its relations to Russia”. The last point he made concerned the NRC, which 
according to Karaganov “in reality it isn’t very beneficial” to Russia. Thus, in his article, 
Karaganov sums up perspectives on the alliance seen in the official NATO discourse in the 
articles from RG from 2004 and up until then. He drew an image of NATO as an alliance 
which was aggressive in nature, inhabiting anti-Russian features and working to increase 
Europe’s strength so it could handle Russia with more confidence. However, despite a rather 
negative view on the alliance, Karaganov did in the same article, as referred to previously, 
conclude that a “cold peace is better than confrontation”. He even stated that Russia could be 
a member of NATO, but then it would have to be a different NATO, suggesting that Russia 
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was willing to contribute to a security community, but on other terms than what the alliance 
was offering (rg.ru 2008.12.10).   
Another aspect of the NATO debate in 2009-2010 was the focus on how bad 
relations with Russia did not benefit either the US, EU or NATO, which is why these resumed 
their bonds with Russia after the high level of tensions in 2008 (rg.ru 2009.02.12a). The 
signals from Washington were described by Konstantin Kosachev, the head of the Duma’s 
Committee on International Relations. He pointed at how where these gestures “can only be 
welcomed – as they have been long awaited” (rg.ru 2009.02.12b). There was much focus on 
how the international community described the need for good Russia-relations, and the 
initiatives from America and NATO (rg.ru 2009.03.27).  
In an interview with the permanent representative to NATO in Brussels, Dmitri 
Rogozin, the feeling of careful optimism may also be detected. On the question on what he 
believed about the prospects of Russia having a comprehensive dialogue with NATO in the 
future, Rogozin answered that “we are bound to be a more or less cautious, but still there is a 
positive development” (rg.ru 2009.05.27). Rogozin was also quoted after a meeting at 
ambassador level through the NRC in the spring of 2009. According to the article he was 
satisfied with how the meeting went and was happy that “NATO has abandoned its 
confrontational spirit” and decided to go through with the “reset” in its relations to Russia 
(rg.ru 2009.05.29). These statements might not seem to reflect a very positive image of 
Russia-NATO relations, but seen in contrast to the harsh comments Rogozin is known for, 
these are indeed very optimistic views. The statements, furthermore, display both perspectives 
on how NATO had been perceived as aggressive before the “reset”, and the image of how the 
members of the alliance now had taken to their senses, and understood that resuming contact 
with Russia would serve their interests. 
In addition to a positive perspective on the US “reset” initiated by the new 
American administration, the tone of careful optimism may also be found on the subject of 
NATO’s new secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Even though there was some 
insecurity concerning his position on several matters, for example in terms of the possibility 
of Ukrainian and Georgian memberships in the alliance, his focus on how the discrepancies 
between the alliance and Russia should not stand in the way for a their relationship, was 
highlighted (rg.ru 2009.08.04). His new leadership was further described in a positive tone in 
an article quoting Sergei Lavrov after a meeting through the NRC, which he claimed was a 
successful one thanks to Fogh Rasmussen. Lavrov even saw it as a meeting that “for the first 
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time in years lead to concrete results” (rg.ru 2009.12.07). Moreover, at the end of the year, 
when the new secretary general was to make his first visit in Moscow, the potential of the 
meeting was described as “an important step in the direction of restoring comprehensive 
cooperation” (rg.ru 2009.12.16).  
Furthermore, focus on cooperation continued into 2010, but as noted in the 
overview of the development of the debate, the number of articles published in the federal 
edition of the paper declined during these last years. This tendency may reflect the softening 
in relations taking place, and the lack of news value this subject had in 2009/2010. However, 
during the time of the Lisbon summit in November 2010, the NATO issue seemed to get a 
new revival in RG. Articles underlined its importance as  this was the first NRC meeting at 
the highest level since after the war with Georgia in 2008, and was interpreted as though it 
meant that US and NATO relations now was back on track. The challenges that remained in 
the Russia-NATO relationship were commented, but still, as can be seen in one article, Fogh 
Rasmussen’s statement on how focus ought to be on cooperation, was emphasized (rg.ru 
2010.11.22).  
In addition to articles that may be characterized as factual and as referring to the 
different statements and events, Karaganov again offered his opinions in an article in RG, 
about the NATO summit in Lisbon. Once more, his statement may be said to illustrate 
perspectives worth commenting. First and foremost, he wrote that he was indeed quite 
satisfied with the results of the summit, but not completely. He believed that the alliance’s 
focus on resuming contact with Russia had become a new way for NATO to justify its 
existence. Thus, he stated, the fact that Medvedev was present in Lisbon actually legitimized 
the alliance. This elevates Russia’s role at the international arena, as the security alliance 
supposedly lived only for having a normal relationship with its neighbor in the East. This was 
further perceived as a positive development for Russia, because having a close relationship 
with NATO might “strengthen our position in the world” - especially if the West’s position 
would weaken (rg.ru 2010.11.24). Karaganov pointed out how a close relationship with China 
too could strengthen Russia’s position, as this indeed was seen as the West’s main enemy. His 
statements reflect a perspective on how Russia could strengthen its role, preferably in 
combination with a weakened West and NATO. This is an image of world politics that fits 
well with the description of the principles of a zero-sum game. 
As already mentioned, in NG, the debate about NATO after the war with Georgia 
took a somewhat different direction than the one described above in RG. Despite some 
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optimism about of resuming contact with NATO, the articles from NG focused more on the 
underlying differences between Russia and the alliance. However, some optimism may be 
detected, such as in the article “Isolation finally ended for Moscow”. Here, hope was 
displayed by suggesting that after the “most difficult phase in the Russia-NATO crisis has 
been overcome” the informal contact through the NRC would result in “mutual 
understanding” (ng.ru 2008.12.08).  
However, the many obstacles that were blocking the path to comprehensive 
cooperation and greater integration were also discussed. As an example, one article treated 
what it saw as four major challenges in the relationship. The first was the lack of dialogue 
between the two parts, as a consequence of the break in formal meetings after the war in 
Georgia. The second issue was seen as the conflicting perspectives on the possibility of 
Ukraine and Georgia entering the alliance. The third were the problems linked to the lack of 
ratification of the new CFE treaty, and the fourth was the continued insecurity linked to the 
plans of an American ABM system in Europe (ng.ru 2009.01.23). Hence, a more moderate 
approach to the possibility of resuming full contact with NATO was observed here, than that 
found in RG. However, the article did conclude by quoting the Russian official statement 
where the will to constructive dialogue from Moscow’s side was emphasized (ng.ru 
2009.01.23).  
As in RG, NATO’s new secretary general was treated with interest also in NG. 
For example in an article under the headline “New secretary general – old problems” the 
expectations to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, were discussed (ng.ru 2009.08.07). A more cautious 
approach to what could be expected of the new leadership was noticeable here. For example 
on Fogh Rasmussens’s statement on the importance of Russia as a partner to NATO, one 
article commented how it was “peculiar that these words have been uttered also by Jaap De 
Hoop Scheffer, and by his predecessor lord George Robertson, and even before them by the 
secretary general Javier Solana (…) and yet a strategic partnership has still not been formed” 
(ng.ru 2009.08.07). This may be interpreted as disappointment, and an image of the alliance 
being unable to turn its statements into actions.  
However, a more optimistic approach to the new secretary general could also be 
detected. Such as from an article that refereed to more positive notes from the Russian 
permanent representative to NATO, Rogozin. According to Rogozin here, the new secretary 
general was a man who, in contrast to Scheffer, was a real politician and not a bureaucrat and 
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having this man as NATO’s leader was described as offering “new possibilities” to the 
Russia-NATO relationship (ng.ru 2009.09.18).  
The debate about NATO in NG in 2010 continues along the same lines as in 2009, 
and towards the Lisbon summit in November. The process of restoring contact between the 
alliance and Russia, with all its obstacles and challenges, was discussed. But towards the end 
of the year, a slight change may be detected, as there seems to be a somewhat more optimistic 
tone in some of the articles. For example, the article “NATO too wants to have “reset” in its 
relationship with Russia” discussed the positive trend in Russia-NATO relations. One of these 
was Medvedev’s invitation to the Lisbon summit (ng.ru 2010.09.23). Another example of 
positive perspectives on the Russia-NATO future can be found in an article that recognized 
the differences that existed between Russia and NATO at the time, but saw the development 
away from bipolar confrontations and towards the world as it was at the end of the 
millennium’s first decade, as one which held possibilities for the Russian diplomacy. The 
article saw this new world order as Russia’s chance not just to lead a “reactive” policy, but a 
policy that was built on initiative and one that “use the possibilities of the extended dialogue” 
to enhance the position of Russian diplomacy (ng.ru 2010.10.18). 
 However, as noted earlier, the paper’s articles can offer both negative and 
positive comments on NATO. Iin an article from October 2010, the little information given on 
NATO’s new strategic concept, which was to be launched at the summit in Lisbon, was 
commented. The journalist portrayed skepticism on how these plans were to be executed, and 
asked how the strategy could be completed when the countries of NATO were decreasing 
their military budgets at the time. He believed that NATO, with this new strategy, was trying 
to “reconcile the irreconcilable”, or as he wrote in even harsher words, he saw the strategy an 
attempt to “cross a snake and a hedgehog” (ng.ru 2010.10.11).  
Despite the skepticism, around the time of the Lisbon summit articles that had a 
more optimistic approach than earlier may be found. One example is the article “Lisbon 
success for Russia and NATO”, which described the summit in relations to the Russia-NATO 
relationship as a positive one (ng.ru 2010.11.22). Furthermore, despite the aspect of problems 
concerning mutual trust, which the article described as still being present, it had an overall 
positive tone. In addition, the invitation for Medvedev to take part in the development of an 
ABM system was sees as one of the most important results of the summit (ng.ru 2010.11.22). 
This reflects how the feeling of playing an active role in the making of security policy in 
Europe appeals to the aspirations in Russia to be treated as an equal. 
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In Novaya, the debate about NATO in 2009-2010 may be said to be concerned 
with the process of reconnecting in terms of whether, at this time, Russia was ready for 
NATO and whether NATO was ready for Russia. This approach can be found in articles 
discussing the differences in mentality of NATO’s members and Russia, in terms of security 
and how was built on a mutual distrust (novayagazeta.ru 2009.04.08). 
Moreover, the underlying though of zero-sum game in Russian foreign policy was 
highlighted through the relationship with NATO. This can be seen from the discussed 
differences in approaches to security. An example of this is from an article that assessed these 
differences by pointing at how NATO saw that a good relationship with Russia, despite the 
fact of major differences, was necessary in terms of global security. While Moscow, on the 
other side, had a different perspective, as the gains of NATO were perceived as Russia’s loss 
(novayagazeta.ru 2009.05.06). This perspective on the Russia-NATO relationship highlights 
Moscow’s aspirations for balance of power and touches upon the perspective on how 
cooperation always results in how one part must sacrifice for the other to succeed. 
The foreign policy of Moscow is further commented in Novaya’s articles. One 
example is an article that commented on Rasmussen’s trip to Russia in 2009. Here the 
positive words of the new secretary general on the future possibility of the NATO-Russia 
relationship was referred to, and the spheres of common interests described. In the end of the 
article, however, there were some concluding remarks concerning the underlying perspectives 
on foreign policy in Kremlin. According to the article “pragmatism” had become so well liked 
in Kremlin that it seemed as though the Russian ruling elite were using the NRC as “the main 
forum for European security system”. This meant that they would not have to bother with the 
troublesome demands from OSCE on democratic values (novayagazeta.ru 2009.09.21). Such 
comments on the direction Russia was taking have been observed frequently. Another 
example of how articles from Novaya criticized the direction Russia was taking, is an article 
that claimed that due to the path Kremlin had chosen for Russia, it could not be expected that 
Russia would build on “the value of democracy, civil and human rights” in the nearest future 
(novayagazeta.ru 2007.02.12). 
The debate in Novaya on the difference in mentality in terms of security in NATO 
and in Russia, continued into the summer of 2010. The expectations held in the West to post-
Soviet Russia was seen as having been as too high, as they were built on the illusion of how 
Russia shared the “European and American mind” (novayagazeta.ru 2010.06.21). This 
implied that Russia did indeed not share the mind European and American. Even though 
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NATO and Russia still were faced with the same threats, the approach to these challenges was 
described as unlike. These differences in mindset further made a partnership between them 
difficult. Another aspect pointed out, worth highlighting, was how it was seen as timely that 
the Russian leadership decided what it perceived as a bigger threat “Iran and its nuclear 
weapons, Al-Qaida and Afghanistan or Georgian membership in NATO and activity by the 
alliance outside the area of Euro-Atlantic zone” (novayagazeta.ru 2010.06.21). This last 
comment may be seen as a call for the Russian government to focus on real threats, not on 
fictional or less imposing threats.  
Furthermore, an article from Novaya also offers criticism to the partners Russia 
had chosen for itself through evaluating cooperation on security through the CSTO. 
According to one article, the attempt of the CSTO to build a security alliance in fact resulted 
in a “parody of NATO”, because “NATO actually offers its members security” 
(novayagazeta.ru 2010.07.07). Russia’s partners were described as “dictatorships no one feels 
threatened by, except the other member countries of the CSTO” (novayagazeta.ru 
2010.07.07). The article not just criticized Moscow’s strategy in terms of Russia’s security, 
but it reflected the perspective of discontent with Kremlin for fraternizing with countries that 
since the fall of the Soviet Union have not emphasized a democratic development. 
A more optimistic perspective on the future of Russia may be found after the 
Lisbon summit in November. The fact that Medvedev was present at the summit was 
compared with the importance of Putin’s presence at the Riga summit in 2002. Even though 
not many concrete results were expected from the summit, one article pointed at how the 
“Lisbon spirit” sent important signals for possible future cooperation. In contrast to the article 
that noted how the Russian leadership preferred NATO before OSCE above, this article 
further concluded that even though NATO might not be the type of alliance that has “fight for 
human rights and freedom of press” as its main focus, “in a modern world defense and 
security does not only consist of control over territories, but also protection of values” 
(Novayagazeta.ru 2010.11.19). It then went on to ask, and it feels as though it did so with a 








4.9 Concluding remarks 
As the analysis of the NATO debate has showed, there exists a range of views and opinions 
about NATO, and on the Russian government’s policy towards the alliance, in the three 
Russian newspapers chosen for this study.  
In terms of the main concerns of the debate between 2004 and 2010, the short 
overview of the debate in the first part of the chapter, touched upon the aspects of the debate 
given most attention. These were further studied more in depth in the second part of the 
chapter. This included, firstly, the aspect of the 2004-enlargement of NATO. Secondly, the 
side of the NATO debate linked to perspectives on the possibilities of Georgia and Ukraine 
entering the alliance. Thirdly, it also led to treating the aspect of the debate concerned with 
the alliance presence in other post-Soviet republics, mainly in Central Asia, and fourthly, at 
the aspect of the CFE treaty and the ABM system. From studying the development of the 
debate, it became obvious that the period that followed the war with Georgia in 2008, was 
best discussed as a separate part. This was due to the noticeable change in the focus of the 
debate during these last years, where the process of resuming contact was the main subject of 
interest.  
The analysis has showed that when treating the main issues of the debate closer, 
the NATO discourse in the three newspapers displayed a range of perspectives on the 
alliance. These were both in line with the official views, as seen in RG and to a certain degree 
in NG, as well as being in great contrast to these, as seen in both NG and Novaya. The 
analysis has also showed that the articles in RG presented the official view without offering 
much analysis and comment. The articles in NG and Novaya, however, offered analysis on 
both on NATO and the on Moscow’s way of dealing with the alliance.  
In the thesis’ last chapter, the six sub questions asked in the introduction will be 
answered by discussing the results of the analysis. The main perspectives on NATO in the 
Russian newspaper discourse will be discussed, and how these reflect some general trends in 







Chapter five: Conclusion 
 
 
5.0 The NATO discourse in Russian newspapers 
The main goal of this thesis was stated in the introduction as gaining a better understanding of 
Russian views on NATO by analyzing the main perspectives on the alliance in Russian 
newspapers. The research question asked what the NATO discourse could tell us about the 
Russian perspectives on the alliance, and further, what the perspectives on NATO could tell 
us about Russian foreign policy more in general.  
Six sub questions were added to the main research question in order to break 
down the analysis of the NATO discourse into more comprehensible subjects, which could be 
treated separately. These concerned, first: whether there was a debate about NATO between 
2004 and the end of 2010, and second: if the perspectives were in line with or contrasted 
official views, third: if the articles were of descriptive rather than normative character, fourth: 
whether images of NATO were mainly negative, or more nuanced, fifth: what the debate’s 
main concerns were, and sixth: if the change of presidency in Russia in 2008 influenced the 
debate about NATO. 
In order to offer an analysis that could answer these questions extensively, the 
thesis looked at how using the principles of a discourse analysis could be useful in terms of 
being able to comprehend the context in which the articles were written. Norman Faircogh’s 
model of a three layered analysis was adapted to my analysis, by using his principles of an 
interrelation between text and context. While the articles are seen as the main subject of 
analysis, analyzing the NATO discourse in these articles was seen as dependent on knowledge 
of both the media climate in which they were written, and on the history of the Russia-NATO 
relationship. Thus, in order to offer a thorough analysis, this thesis offered a backdrop for the 
analysis consisting of background information on the media in Russia, and on Russia-NATO 
relations. The development of a media climate with extensive governmental control was 
treated in chapter two, and the aspect of how the printed press in Russia can be said to be 
relatively free in contrast to TV was discussed. In chapter three, some aspects of the Russian 
identity, such as great power aspirations, Russia’s complex relationship with the West and its 
special relationship with its “near abroad”, were discussed. These are seen as relevant for 
understanding the Russia-NATO relationship, as these aspects of Russian identity affects 
foreign policy priorities. The chapter also looked at the development of the Russia-NATO 
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relationship from the Cold War and until the end of 2010, treating some of the main events 
and discussing how the relationship, since the end of the Second World War, has been 
characterized by a complex combination of confrontations and cooperation. This background 
information was useful in the process of analyzing the articles.  
In terms of the six questions asked on the different aspects of the NATO debate in 
the Russian newspapers, the analysis in chapter four is worth reassessing. First, as the analysis 
of the debate from 2004 until 2010 clearly showed, there was indeed a debate about NATO in 
the three Russian newspapers. The analysis mainly treated the aspect of enlargement in the 
NATO debate, as this was seen as one of the main concerns in all of the three papers in 
relations to NATO in this period. Furthermore, as chapter four illustrated, there was a distinct 
difference between the papers, and they displayed a wide range of views.  
In terms of the question on whether the papers presented official views on the 
alliance or offered contrasting opinions, the articles from RG were used as a point of 
reference. RG’s status as an official newspaper means that the perspectives on the alliance 
observed in the paper, are official views. As the analysis illustrated, NG had numerous of 
articles on issues linked to NATO. The paper not only had a large number of articles 
available, it also offered a whole range of perspectives on the alliance. These could be seen as 
being both in line with the official perspectives seen in RG, and in stark contrast to these. 
Perhaps the clearest sign of critique to the official perspective was the obvious discontent over 
Moscow’s diplomacy in relations to NATO matters, linked to the battle for influence in areas 
of the post-Soviet republics. Further, the analysis showed how Novaya lived up to its profile 
as an oppositional newspaper, as it to a large extent offered critical perspectives on Moscow 
and the Russian leadership. The two more independent newspapers also offered analysis of 
the Russia-NATO relationship, which was missing in RG. While articles from both NG and 
Novaya often can be characterized as being normative, the articles in RG were mainly 
descriptive. The exceptions were the articles written by Sergei Karaganov, referred to several 
places in the analysis as they displayed perspectives on the alliance in line with what one 
would expect from journalists working at the official newspaper in Russia, had they offered 
more analysis.  
On the question concerning whether the images of the alliance in the Russian 
NATO discourse in the newspapers were mainly negative, or if the picture was more nuanced, 
the analysis in chapter four showed that there were indeed both positive and negative 
approaches to the alliance. In RG, the images of NATO followed the general development of 
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positive or negative views dependent on the situation, while NG often offered both positive 
and negative perspectives on one and the same issue. While the articles in Novaya were less 
concerned with analyzing the alliance, the articles from the paper seemed more concerned 
with the Russian government’s way of dealing with the alliance, which it was mainly negative 
to.  
Already in the overview of the debate in the first part of chapter four, the 
importance of the competition for influence in the post-Soviet space and the enlargement of 
NATO in these areas, became apparent. The main issues in the NATO debate concerned the 
2004 enlargement of NATO, possible Ukrainian and Georgian memberships, NATO’s 
presence in the areas of Central Asia and Caucasus, as well as the disagreement over the CFE 
treaty and the possible ABM system in Eastern-Europe. After the suspension of formal 
contact through the NRC as a result of the war in Georgia, the debate became more concerned 
with possibilities for resuming contact and “reset” in NATO relations. As these were seen as 
the debate’s main concerns within the timeframe set for the study, these topics were analyzed 
closer in the second part of chapter four.  
The last question added in order to better deal with the NATO discourse in the 
Russian newspapers, was whether the change in presidency affected the debate about NATO. 
As illustrated in the analysis, the change of presidency in the Russian Federation, where 
Dmitri Medvedev took over the post after Vladimir Putin, can hardly be detected in the 
NATO debate in the three newspapers. In contrast, Barack Obama and the new American 
administration were given much attention, especially as the term “reset” was frequently 
discussed and referred to. NATO’s new secretary general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and his 
abilities as a political and his focus on good relations with Russia, was also treated with keen 
interest. The attempt in the West to reach out to Russia by emphasizing the country’s 
importance in world politics, and how good relations were beneficial to the West, seemed to 
be noticed in Russia. In terms of the new Russian presidency, however, there seems to have 
been a sense of indifference, as though knowing that the ruling elite in Kremlin and its foreign 
policy would remain the same, despite a new presidency.  
Moreover, by analyzing the main issues in the debate the goal was to find 
perspectives on NATO which could contribute to a better understanding of the Russian views 
on the alliance. As the analysis showed, there were some perspectives on the alliance which 
can be claimed important in the quest for understanding how NATO is perceived in Russia. 
There were both negative and positive perspectives, and in terms of negative, the perspectives 
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on how NATO is perceived as an alliance that has anti-Russian features and which is by 
nature hostile to Russia, can be said is of importance. The analysis pointed at how Trenin 
(2007:35) explained the negative views Russia has on other states or alliances as rooted in the 
aspect of Russian realpolitik, where any subject which has a substantial military capacity is 
perceived as a potential threat. Thus, the mere fact that NATO is an alliance with military 
power, means that it poses a potential danger to Russia. Further, another important negative 
perspective on the alliance is how it is perceived as untrustworthy, due to the alleged promise 
given to Gorbachev on no-NATO enlargement eastwards. This controversial debate has 
caused an image in Russia of NATO being an alliance which breaks its promises. 
 In terms of positive perspectives, the analysis showed that NATO was perceived 
as being able to serve as a bridge between Russia and the West. Further, it was also seen as 
beneficial to Russia to have good relations with the alliance. Even though this does not reflect 
an outright positive view on NATO itself, Russia-NATO relations can be seen as being 
looked upon as posing possibilities to Russia. It is worth noting that, in the articles which 
were positive to NATO, especially in RG, the aspect of cooperation was seen as favorable due 
to how it might strengthen Russia’s role. On the other side, cooperation with NATO was also 
seen as a way for the Russian government to start taking into account democratic values as a 
part of its security policy, such as seen in several articles from Novaya. It may also be worth 
pointing out that, in NG and Novaya, a number of articles were more critical to the Russian 
government’s handling of NATO issues, than they were either positive or negative to NATO 
as an alliance.  
Both the negative and positive perspectives illustrate some important aspects of 
how NATO is perceived in Russia. When discussing the Russia’s relationship with the 
alliance, several of these perspectives can explain some of the attitudes towards the 
organization. Moreover, after having analyzed the NATO discourse in Russian newspapers, 
there are some aspects of this discourse which indeed confirm images of Russian foreign 
policy more in general. From analyzing the debate about NATO in the three papers, it became 
clear that the idea of zero-sum thinking and the image of balance of power are present in 
Russian foreign policy in respect to its relationship with NATO. These are aspects which are 
known for being important in Russian foreign policy also on other matters (Kratochvíl 2008: 
404).  Further, from analyzing the NATO debate, the image of Russian foreign policy as 
contradictive, and characterized by both friendly rhetoric and harsh comments, became clear. 
This is “puzzling combination of contradictory attitudes” is also a feature used to describe the 
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overall Russian foreign policy culture (Ermarth 2006: 7). As a last point, being treated like an 
equal by NATO is an aspect of the debate that reflects the overall aspiration for being treated 
as a great power and an important player at the international arena. Neumann and Pouloit 
(2011: 113) describe Russian diplomacy as untimely due to its attempt to punch “above its 
weight”, which is seen as a consequence of its aspirations for being treated as an equal. 
The Russia-NATO relationship has been through many waves of increasing and 
decreasing tensions, as illustrated in chapter three. And while some images of NATO are 
rooted back to the time of the Cold War, others have emerged as the results of these other 
waves. Within the period analyzed for this study, the Russia-NATO relationship went through 
a new wave of both stagnation and prosperity. The thesis has showed that within the NATO 
discourse in Russian newspapers in the period between 2004 and 2010, some images of the 
alliance were static, while other came as a result of new events in the relationship. 
Hence, the thesis has demonstrated that in spite of a controlled media environment 
in Russia, a range of views and perspectives on both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and on Russia’s relationship with the alliance, is to be found in the NATO discourse in the 
three chosen Russian newspapers. The debate from 2004 until the end of 2010 to a large 
extent followed the external level of low-high-low tension. While some images of the alliance 
seem to be constant, other has emerged as the result of new events in the relationship. This 
has resulted in an image of the NATO discourse in the Russian newspapers consisting of a 
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http://www.rg.ru/2006/06/06/uchenia.html 
 
rg.ru 2006.11.29: В узких улочках НАТO: 
http://www.rg.ru/2006/11/29/nato-karaganov.html 
 






rg.ru 2007.03.28: Заявка на членство: 
 http://www.rg.ru/printable/2007/03/28/nato.html 
 
rg.ru 2007.06.26: НАТО подбирается к Москве: 
http://www.rg.ru/2007/06/26/nato.html 
 
rg.ru 2007.03.14: Европа боится ПРОторговаться: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2007/03/14/nato.html 
 
rg.ru 2007.12.07: Брюссель тянет резину: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2007/12/07/dovse.html 
 




rg.ru 2008.01.17: На расстоянии выстрела: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2008/01/17/ukraina-nato.html 
 
rg.ru 2008.03.26: О России - НАТО и о большем:  
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2008/03/26/karaganov.html 
 
rg.ru 2008.04.05: Путин выступил в НАТО: 
http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/05/putin.html  
 
rg.ru 2008.04.02: Европейские фанато:  
http://www.rg.ru/2008/04/02/sammit-voprosy.html  
 
rg.ru 2008.08.26: Разморозили: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2008/08/26/president.html 
 
rg.ru 2008.12.04: За закрытыми дверьми: 




rg.ru 2008.12.10: Нужна ли нам НАТО?: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2008/12/10/nato.html 
 




rg.ru 2009.02.12a: Лавров записался в ремонтную бригаду:  
http://www.rg.ru/2009/02/12/lavrov.html  
 
rg.ru 2009.02.12b: Поймать Америку на слове: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/02/12/kosachev.html 
 
rg.ru 2009.03.27: Вилка для Обамы: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/03/27/obama-nato.html 
 
rg.ru 2009.05.27: В поисках позитива: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/05/27/rogozin.html 
 
rg.ru 2009.05.29: Прозрение альянса: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/05/29/rogozin-nato.html 
 
rg.ru 2009.08.04: Премьера от генсека: 
 http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/08/04/rasmussen.html 
 
rg.ru 2009.12.07: Натовские яблочки: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2009/12/07/rossiya-nato.html 
 






rg.ru 2010.11.22: Не против: 
http://www.rg.ru/printable/2010/11/22/perezapusk.html 
 




ng.ru: http://www.ng.ru/about/  
 
2004: 
ng.ru 2004.06.28: Перерождение НАТО: 
http://www.ng.ru/world/2004-06-28/6_nato.html 
 
ng.ru 2004.03.26: Сергей Иванов дает сдачи НАТО: 
http://www.ng.ru/world/2004-03-26/6_nato.html 
 
ng.ru 2004.04.09: «Нечеткое» партнерство Россия–НАТО: 
http://www.ng.ru/world/2004-04-09/6_nato.html 
 
ng.ru 2004.04.02: Будущее НАТО – на Ближнем Востоке: 
 http://www.ng.ru/world/2004-04-02/6_nato.html 
 
ng.ru 2004.04.05: Россия–НАТО: противостояние только начинается: 
http://www.ng.ru/courier/2004-04-05/11_nato.html 
 









ng.ru 2005.10.20: Оранжевая многовекторность: 
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-10-20/5_mnogovektornost.html 
 
ng.ru 2005.03.18: На пороге светлого колониального будущего: 
http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2005-03-18/9_ideology.html  
 




ng.ru 2006.01.12: Москва подтолкнула Украину в НАТО: 
http://www.ng.ru/cis/2006-01-12/5_ukraina.html 
 
ng.ru 2006.06.09: Москва, критикуя Украину, сама дружит с НАТО: 
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2006-06-09/1_nato.html 
 
ng.ru 2006.11.27: НАТО тесно в евроатлантическом пространстве: 
 http://www.ng.ru/courier/2006-11-27/13_nato.html 
 
ng.ru 2006.10.23: Калитка на Запад: 
 http://www.ng.ru/courier/2006-10-23/18_nato.html 
 
ng.ru 2006.09.11: Пробуксовка на натовском направлении: 
 http://www.ng.ru/courier/2006-09-11/18_probuksovka.html 
 
ng.ru 2006.09.20: Завтра НАТО заявит о сближении с Грузией: 
 http://www.ng.ru/cis/2006-09-20/1_nato.html 
 






ng.ru 2007.03.28: Разноскоростная интеграция: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/76756  
 
ng.ru 2007.12.10: США блокировали проекты РФ–НАТО: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/191110  
 
ng.ru 2007.02.02: Соревнование асимметричных ответов: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/75379  
 
ng.ru 2007.09.12: НАТО оккупирует российскую базу: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/102795  
 
ng.ru 2007.03.30: Без паники и истерики: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/76847  
 




ng.ru 2008.08.18: НАТО ответит России за Грузию 
http://www.ng.ru/world/2008-08-18/6_nato.html  
 
ng.ru 2008.08.29: Россия–НАТО: холодное лето 2008-го года: 
http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/214845  
 
ng.ru 2008.11.21: От редакции: 
http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/218798  
 
ng.ru 2008.02.14: И не НАТО: 
http://www.ng.ru/courier/2008-02-04/18_nenato.html 
 









ng.ru 2009.01.23: Россия–НАТО: четыре острых вопроса: 
http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/221351   
 
ng.ru 2009.08.07: Генсек – новый, проблемы – старые: 
http://nvo.ng.ru/printed/229377  
 
ng.ru 2009.09.18: НАТО готова забыть старые обиды: 
 http://www.ng.ru/printed/231080  
 
2010: 
ng.ru 2010.09.23: НАТО тоже хочет устроить перезагрузку отношений с Россией: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/245535  
 
ng.ru 2010.10.11: НАТО пытается совместить несовместимое: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/246245  
 
ng.ru 2010.10.18: Стратегические посиделки: 
http://www.ng.ru/printed/246534  
 









novayagazeta.ru 2004.04.05: БОРЬБА С НАТО — НАЦИОНАЛЬНАЯ РУССКАЯ ЗАБАВА: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/24317.html  
 




novayagazeta.ru 2005.04.25a: НАТО СЫГРАЕТ ВСТУПЛЕНИЕ: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/27590.html  
 









novayagazeta.ru 2007.03.01: Усыновление Грузии: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/36720.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2007.12.17: Лукашенко сделали штык:  
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/32729.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2007.02.12: МОРОСЯЩИЕ ВОЖДИ: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/36969.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2007.07.16: Так мы выходим или входим?: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/34818.html  
 






novayagazeta.ru 2008.04.07: «Я дембель», – сказал Владимир Путин в Бухаресте: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/40741.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2008.08.06: Россия как вызов: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/39167.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2008.08.25: А трофеи как же?: 
 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/38970.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2008.08.21: Запад заговорил с грузинским акцентом: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/39027.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2008.09.01: «Филателистов» лучше не злить: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/38905.html  
 




novayagazeta.ru 2009.01.27: После паузы: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/46358.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2009.04.08: Представительские походы: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/45506.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2009.05.06: Есть контакт. Искрит…:  
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/45191.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2009.09.21: Давайте без иллюзий: 





novayagazeta.ru 2010.06.21: А доверия все нет:  
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/3011.html  
 
novayagazeta.ru 2010.07.07: Колониализм по Кукрыниксам: 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/2799.html  
 






Links to articles read for the study, but not referred to in the text. 
2004: 
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http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/122/13.html?print=201118051423 
http://www.novgaz.ru/data/2010/132/01.html?print=201123060312  
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/011/09.html 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/032/03.html 
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2010/044/10.html 
 
